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THE RECENT LITERATURE UPON THE RESURRECTION OF CHRIST

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No other doctrine of Christian theology has been regarded as more important than the doctrine that Jesus Christ rose from the dead. It has often been affirmed that upon this doctrine the church was founded; that it is the one great fact which binds together the life of Jesus in the flesh and his eternal life at the right hand of God; which confirms his teaching and his high claims; which gives to men the right to love and worship him with a supreme devotion, to believe in his continued ministration to his people, to anticipate his return to perfect and govern his kingdom in the earth, and to rest in the assurance of their own immortal life with him. It is not strange, therefore, that in the flux of modern thought many should turn their attention to this significant doctrine. It is, moreover, not only an important article of the Christian faith, but it is also one in the support and interpretation of which various lines of investigation are involved. It is, first of all, a historical question, which demands a careful examination of witnesses and testing of evidence; it has come to be, of late at least, a psychological question, demanding careful analysis of the state of mind of the early witnesses, the accumulation and comparison of other cases in which men and women have believed that they saw the forms and heard the voices of the departed. The hypotheses suggested by the experiments of psychical research have been thought by some to throw at least a dim and uncertain light upon this doctrine; and, further, the question whether there is a vital

and necessary connection between a firm conviction of the bodily resurrection of Jesus and a confident and aggressive Christian faith has come to seem to some an open question, demanding careful and discriminating examination. It is not surprising, therefore, that the literature upon this subject should have much increased during the last fifteen or twenty years, nor that the methods of discussion and the conclusions reached by able and sincere men should differ widely. It is the purpose of this article to give some account of these recent discussions, without attempting to review or criticise in detail the individual books and monographs and the articles in various English and German periodicals which have been published in such large numbers.

There are three lines of evidence which are appealed to in support of the conviction that Jesus rose from the dead. The first is the testimony that, upon the Sunday morning which followed the placing of his body in the tomb, the body had disappeared; the second is the testimony that soon after this discovery certain persons and groups of persons affirmed that they had received evidence that Jesus was living, and had revealed himself to them and communicated with them; the third is that the impression which Jesus had made during his life before his crucifixion, the scheme of ministration which he outlined for himself, the assurances which he gave of his return to take up again and perfect his work, and the history of Christianity for the past centuries, confirm this testimony and establish this fact. Each of these arguments receives critical examination in the light of modern knowledge and convictions.

How much evidence is there that the tomb in which the body had been laid on Friday evening was empty on Sunday morning? There is no doubt that the four Evangelists when they wrote their Gospels believed this. But the earliest of these Evangelists wrote not less than thirty-five years after the event, and at least two of the others substantially repeat his statement, though with some modifications due perhaps to other traditions. Apparently we have at most but two reports which are in any sense independent. All these Gospels were written not only long after the events but far from the scene where it was believed they occurred. So far as the witnesses themselves are concerned, they were, according to these different statements, one, two, three, or more than three,

women, and, in one Gospel, two men. All these witnesses, with perhaps one exception, had disappeared before the records in their present form were made. Of Mary Magdalene and her companions we are told nothing after that eventful morning; none of the writers of the Gospels claim to have interrogated her, nor is it probable that more than one of them ever saw her or any one of the women who are associated with her. Moreover, according to the accounts given, Mary and her friends were not in a position nor in a state of mind to make careful observations or to correct hasty conclusions. They saw, as they thought, a vision of angels; according to one report there was a great earthquake; an angel rolled the stone away and sat upon it, from whom lightnings flashed and whose robe glistened like snow, while the tomb was surrounded by prostrate forms of panic-stricken soldiers. The other reports are not so graphic and startling, and these features are regarded by many as embellishments of the earlier and simpler tradition; but these features suggest the unfitness of these women to give testimony to the state of the grave, or the want of care and discrimination in the man who put their testimony on record. Indeed, in the First Gospel the women do not enter or even inspect the tomb.

The earlier and calmer report given in the Gospel of Mark affirms that they entered the tomb, and were invited by the young man to view the place where the body had been laid; but, strangely enough, the result of their inspection is not given. The Gospel of Luke tells the story in a way which implies still less excitement and more definite testimony. At the beginning of the scene the women enter the tomb, and find not the body of the Lord Jesus, after which "two men" appear and speak to them. In the Fourth Gospel, Mary comes to the tomb while it is yet dark, sees that the stone is removed, and without inspection infers at once that the body has been removed. She runs away, but returns later and looks into the tomb, and sees two angels, who address her. It is not strange that such records of testimony even to so simple a fact—a fact so easily tested as the vacant place in the tomb—should excite suspicion and doubt.

The other witnesses, according to the Fourth Gospel, are Simon Peter and the disciple whom Jesus loved. It is reported that they

both entered the tomb, saw the grave-clothes and took careful note of them, and then went away. This is plain and simple; and it is neither contradicted, reconstructed, nor confirmed in the other Gospels. Indeed, though we have in the New Testament one epistle which seems to have come from Peter, several discourses attributed to him, and two references to him as one who had seen the risen Lord, we have no confirmation of this inspection of the tomb, unless it be the quotation from a Psalm in Acts 2 24, which seems, indeed, to express a Christian's conviction rather than testimony to a fact observed; and, although we have several other writings which came at least from the circle to which the other disciple belonged, there is no further reference to the discovery at the open grave.

This is all the evidence, in the form of testimony to an observed fact, that has been preserved. It is said that Paul's statement in 1 Cor. 15 4 shows that he believed that the body must have disappeared from the grave. This inference seems probable, not only from the connection of the sentences, "he was buried," and "he hath been raised on the third day," but also from what we must believe to be Paul's idea of the resurrection. But that is his theory or explanation of a religious truth; it is not either direct or indirect testimony to a fact observed.

It is held by some that we have, in addition to these statements of the Gospels, the indirect evidence which comes from the silence of those who criticised and opposed the early proclamation of the resurrection. Latham affirms that "all Jerusalem was stirred by the empty tomb." He thinks that the story was told far and wide by the men who saw it.¹ Of this there is no evidence. According to the Acts, the first open proclamation of the resurrection of Jesus was on the day of Pentecost, fifty days after the burial—a period during which many things may have happened. Nor is there any evidence, or any reason to believe, that even then, or later, any systematic, careful effort was made to meet the claim that Jesus' dead body had revived. If the grave was examined by any one, friend or foe, no report of it has been preserved; and the accounts of controversies with the Jews and prosecutions by courts at Jerusalem in the days of the first preaching of the gospel are very meagre,

¹ The Risen Master, pp. 17, 76-86.

and were put in their present form many years after the events occurred. It is not surprising that such evidence as is preserved upon this point seems to some recent writers, including Harnack,² Briggs,³ Loisy,⁴ and Henson,⁵ to be indecisive; while others equally sincere and independent—among them von Dobschütz,⁶ Riggenbach,⁷ Rohrbach,⁸ Schwartzkopff,⁹ Stapfer,¹⁰ and Oscar Holtzmann¹¹—regard the empty grave as an established fact.

But even if there be satisfactory evidence that the body was not in the tomb on that Sunday morning, does that fact go far towards proving that it had been restored to life? The Gospel of Matthew, the Gospel of Peter, and the Acts of Pilate, state that a guard was stationed to prevent the removal of the body. But there is no evidence that the other Evangelists knew of this tradition: if they did, they ignored or rejected it. The incidents at the tomb which they record would seem impossible if wakeful guards were keeping watch, or guards who, "as dead men," were lying on the ground. Moreover, according to the report in Matthew, the grave remained entirely unguarded for the first night after the burial. If either friends or foes desired to remove the body, they would most naturally do so during that first night. That this was done by the disciples, who subsequently proclaimed the resurrection of their Lord, as the stupid slander of their enemies afterwards affirmed, is hardly considered by any modern critic of serious mind. That the Jewish Sanhedrin, or some irresponsible persons, desiring to inflict indignity upon Jesus or pain upon his friends, desecrated the grave, seems to be forbidden by what we know of the state of mind of these officials and persons as well as by the subsequent history. But, excluding such impossible or improbable suggestions, there still remain several ways of accounting for the disappearance of the body. Some friend in Jerusalem—such a man as Nicodemus—perhaps not at all acquainted with the disciples and women from

² History of Dogma, I, 85.

³ Expositor, April, 1905, p. 249.

⁴ The Gospel and the Church, p. 131.

⁵ Hibbert Journal, II, 489.

⁶ Ostern und Pfingsten, p. 21.

⁷ Die Auferstehung Jesu, p. 18.

⁸ Die Berichte über die Auferstehung Jesu Christi, p. 83.

⁹ Monist, October, 1900, p. 7.

¹⁰ The Death and Resurrection of Jesus Christ, p. 189.

¹¹ Life of Jesus, p. 499.

Galilee, may have removed it to some less public place; or Pilate—perhaps with Herod's advice—may have ordered its removal; or, as Lake suggests,¹² the women, in the dim light of early morning and in an unfamiliar region, may have come to the wrong tomb; or perhaps the right explanation is preserved in Mary's suggestion of the gardener—evidently she or the Evangelist thought this entirely possible. Even so confident a believer in the resurrection as Latham does not hesitate to say: "There was, as has been said, nothing very surprising in the fact that the body should have been taken away; it might even have been removed by Joseph and Nicodemus themselves, for the place of interment close to the city had only been chosen because time pressed; and a less accessible spot might be thought preferable."¹³

So much may be said concerning the impression which the testimony to the disappearance of the body from the grave makes upon the minds of critics of our own day of various shades of conviction. The connection supposed to exist between the disappearance of the body and the subsequent revelation of the living Master will be considered later.

What is the real weight of the evidence that after his death and burial Jesus revealed himself to certain of his friends and disciples? Testimony to this is contained in three of our four canonical Gospels; and there can be no doubt that the author of the Gospel of Mark added, or intended to add, at the end of his Gospel, the report of one or more such appearances. The supplement to that Gospel, of early though uncertain origin, the fragments of the Gospel according to the Hebrews and of the Gospel of Peter, and other early documents, repeat or add to this testimony. Earliest and most weighty of all is the Apostle Paul's summary in 1 Cor. 15 3-8 of such appearances, supplemented by his own experience. In this paragraph we have very early tradition, put on record by a man of unusual intelligence who was personally acquainted with at least some of the witnesses; and this tradition is confirmed and interpreted by the scene in which the author himself participated. This more direct testimony is supported by many incidental refer-

¹² *The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ*, pp. 250-252.

¹³ *The Risen Master*, p. 40.

ences to the resurrection in the Acts, the Epistles, and the Apocalypse, and in writings preserved from the earliest Christian literature. This evidence is so full and strong, and so well endures the severe tests to which modern historical investigation compels it to submit, that nearly all recent critics admit its conclusive force. That certain honest and intelligent persons believed that they had seen the Lord Jesus alive after his death and burial may be accepted as established for our generation. (See Schmiedel,¹⁴ Turner,¹⁵ O. Holtzmann,¹⁶ Lake,¹⁷ and many others.)

But, admitting and maintaining this, we are compelled to observe that we are dealing simply with the conviction of certain persons who lived and died in the distant past. We cannot claim that these witnesses were so enlightened that they could make no mistakes, or that those who received, transmitted, and recorded their testimony were preserved from errors in memory or inaccuracy in statement; and we know that neither they themselves nor any of their contemporaries tested their experiences in any careful, scientific way. We deal directly only with convictions, while we strive to ascertain the facts which lie behind them. We must hold, however, that there were certain facts, there were causes which produced these convictions; and the duty of every serious scholar is to seek for those facts, and to discover, if possible, the explanation or hypothesis which best accounts for these experiences.

Various explanations are presented in recent literature: *first*, the body of Jesus which was buried was, in some form, reanimated, and became again the dwelling-place of his spirit; or, *second*, Jesus, as a purely spiritual being—or his heavenly Father—produced in some extraordinary way upon the minds of chosen witnesses impressions which not only convinced them that he was alive, but assumed in their mental vision a form which they identified with his former bodily form; or, *third*, the deep impression which he had made upon their minds, the faith in himself which he had kindled, the belief that he was indeed the Messiah and would fulfil his promise to return and complete the work he had begun, so

¹⁴ Encyclopaedia Biblica, IV, col. 4061.

¹⁵ Hibbert Journal, IV, 382.

¹⁶ Life of Jesus, p. 505.

¹⁷ The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, p. 227.

wrought in their souls that in moments of excitement, of strong desire and hope, they seemed to see the Master with them again as of old, encouraging and instructing them. No sharp lines of separation can be drawn between these three hypotheses—they shade into one another; but they may be roughly classified as the theory of a real bodily resurrection, the theory of objective visions, and the theory of subjective visions.

The great majority of Christians of ancient and modern times have doubtless believed that the body of Jesus was raised from the dead. The writers of the Gospels certainly thought so, and it is probable that Paul thought of the restored, or continued, life of Jesus in the same way. Many Christians have apparently supposed that the body was restored to its former condition; could be weighed and handled, could receive food, and wear clothing. This view appears even in the Gospels, though there it is blended or confused with another conception. Paul, however, seems to reject the idea that the body of the risen Jesus consisted in any sense or degree of the earthly matter which had been buried: it was not the body which was sown, not a body of flesh and blood; it was changed or transformed, or was a body or "habitation" from heaven. Paul, as we have seen, has no interest in the empty tomb, and never refers to the risen Jesus as walking or eating or being touched with hands of flesh. It does not follow from this, however, that he did not suppose that the risen Jesus had a body which was connected in some historical and genetic way with his earthly body. He carried over into his Christian doctrine the belief of his Pharisaic circle in the resurrection of the dead; he believed that all dead and buried Christians would be raised from the dead, and that the bodies of those who were alive in the great day would be changed, not annihilated.

Most modern scholars who accept the doctrine of a bodily resurrection adopt more or less fully what seems to be the view of Paul. The risen body was in a true sense identical with the body which was buried; but it was changed, transfigured, transubstantiated, spiritualized. The identity is explained in various ways. The late Doctor Hovey held that matter can be made a more supple and perfect organ of spirit than it now is, that is, may be made to move with the swiftness of light and the power of electricity at the

indwelling spirit's behest.¹⁸ This is actual, material identity, though the matter has been sublimated.

Another view is that the material of the body disappeared, and in some way a spiritual body sprang out of it, in such a manner that it had the identity of genetic origin. Latham holds that "the body exhaled or evanescenced,"¹⁹ and says, if asked, "'How do you explain this vanishing from the tomb of the material flesh and bones of Christ? This change into something which has all the phenomena without the substance of a human body?' My answer is ready, and it is, to my mind, a triumphant one: 'I do not explain it at all.'"²⁰ David Smith²¹ and Swete²² seem to think that the power of the risen body to resist or ignore the ordinary conditions of bodily life was but the perfecting of the power revealed in his previous life when he passed suddenly from place to place (Luke 4 30, John 5 13, 8 59), and walked on the water, and was transfigured on the mountain. On the contrary, Bernhard Weiss says of the resurrection body: "There is a docetic trait in it of which Jesus' earlier earthly life does not show a trace."²³ Westcott, in an interesting personal letter printed in the *Hibbert Journal* for July, 1904, appeals to the doctrine of an idealistic philosophy, saying: "Matter is, so far as I can see, only the manifestation of force, life in the widest sense, under the conditions of time and space. It has in itself no existence." When Jesus "entered into another form of existence under new conditions His life found a new embodiment."²⁴

This theory of a spiritual body, which sprang from or replaced the body of flesh that was laid in the grave, presents difficulties which its more cautious defenders frankly admit. In the first place, it decreases or destroys the significance of the empty tomb, if it does not actually turn it from an argument for the resurrection into a difficulty which demands explanation. It would require no great force of evidence to lead men to believe that the body of a vigorous young man, free from disease, which after suddenly

¹⁸ American Journal of Theology, IV (1900), 548.

¹⁹ The Risen Master, p. 36.

²⁰ Ibid. p. 18.

²¹ The Days of His Flesh, pp. 239, 273.

²² The Appearances of Our Lord after the Passion, p. 24.

²³ Life of Christ, III, 386.

²⁴ Hibbert Journal, II, 795.

ceasing to breathe had been taken from a cross upon which it had been fastened for a few hours, returned in a few hours more to life and a measure of vigor, left the tomb, and appeared to his friends and rekindled their hope and faith. We might attribute this to special, divine, restoring power—to a miracle, if we chose to apply that name to this conquest over pain and death. On the other hand, it may be beyond the range of our experience, but is not contrary to experience, to suppose that when Jesus' spirit left his body it clothed itself in some light, heavenly form, and through this form communicated with his disciples. The serious perplexity comes when we attempt to combine the two. We know more of the substance of human bodies and the laws which govern them than the ancients knew; we are more impressed with the uniform conditions to which such bodies submit. The human body is composed of certain well-known chemical substances, which pass through certain well-known processes after the vital force has departed. It is not, as it once was, a simple appeal to ignorance and mystery to say that one such body was taken in hand by a strange, heavenly chemistry, and converted into a spiritual body. To believe, not that God quickened and guided the forces which he has appointed and which he administers with such faithful uniformity, but that he destroyed the material which he had created or annulled the laws which he has appointed and administers, demands that we reject and ignore our knowledge. It is not a sufficient reply to such difficulties to say that God could do this. The question of what God can do is out of the range of our knowledge, and not a subject either of faith or rational speculation. The question is whether we can believe that he did it; whether this is the most reasonable explanation of the facts which we are trying to explain. It may be that difficulties of this kind have led some to hold that the risen body was the "individual ideal," or *Grundform*,²⁵ of the body laid in the grave. The same thought seems to find expression in the alternative view of a recent writer, who says, quoting Westcott, "We may suppose that the Lord took up into this Glorified Body the material elements of that human body which was laid in the grave, though . . . true personality lies in the preservation of the individual formula or law which rules the organization

²⁵ Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift, XIII (1902), 258.

in each case, and not in the actual but ever-changing organization which may exist at any moment.”²⁶ But faith in such identity is embarrassed, not aided, by the appeal to the empty grave. The identity must be in the undying spirit, and not in the transubstantiated flesh.

It is manifest, further, that the hypothesis that the body which was buried a material body was raised a spiritual body does not agree with all the phenomena described in the Gospels. The risen Lord suddenly appears and disappears; he is not always promptly recognized; his voice does not always reveal him; he enters doors which have been shut; and finally he disappears from view in the clouds. Here we have suggestions of a spiritual body, if we know how to apprehend such a body, but slight suggestion of identity with the body which was buried. On the other hand we are told that this body which appeared to the women and the disciples bore the wounds of the crucifixion, consisted of flesh and bones, and partook of food. Such a body may well have come from the grave, but we shrink from calling it a spiritual body. We seem to have two conceptions interwoven in the same accounts, but not harmonized or adjusted to any unifying idea. It is not strange that Paul ignored or rejected these grosser features, if, indeed, they were in the tradition which he had received or transmitted. Many who affirm their faith in a spiritual body which is in some way to be identified with the material body that was buried have boldly followed what seems to be his example, saying plainly that eating and the other physical acts and attributes are inconceivable, and that Luke 24 4-43 records “an unhistorical tradition,”²⁷ “a naïve error of tradition,”²⁸ an impossibility,²⁹ a secondary feature,³⁰ or, perhaps a “later idea.”³¹

Others (as Garvie³² and Bernard³³) regard these as mere signs:

²⁶ Church Quarterly Review, January, 1906, p. 341.

²⁷ David Smith, *Expositor*, Sixth Series, VIII, 359.

²⁸ W. Beyschlag, *Studien und Kritiken*, 1899, p. 532.

²⁹ E. G. Steude, *Die Auferstehung Jesu Christi*, p. 20.

³⁰ F. Loofs, *Die Auferstehungsberichte und ihr Wert*, p. 28.

³¹ B. Weiss, *Life of Christ*, III, 391.

³² *Studies in the Inner Life of Jesus*, p. 434.

³³ *Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible*, IV, 234.

eating was to prove identity, not to satisfy a need. The Lord assumed "a form which bore on it the marks of the Crucifixion. . . . The sign was only wanted for a temporary need."³⁴ But such explanations attribute to the acts a purpose hardly consistent with sincerity. Showing wounds and eating food must leave certain impressions which the theory implies were not in accordance with the real needs and conditions of the risen body.

Still others are content to affirm that this eating was simply a miracle which cannot be explained;³⁵ and which, it must be added, seems to demand the belief that "a piece of a broiled fish," as well as the body of the Lord, passed through this miraculous transmutation. Westcott,³⁶ Randolph,³⁷ and Weber³⁸ hold that the phrase "flesh and bones" in Luke 24 39 is not inconsistent with the conditions of a spiritual body, as "flesh and blood" (1 Cor. 15 50) would have been; as if flesh combined with blood would be material, but with bones spiritual! Flesh and bones are the constituent parts which would be in evidence in presenting such proof as the text contemplates.

The fact is that there are difficulties with this hypothesis of a spiritual body which are not removed by simply rejecting or skillfully explaining these more materialistic features of the Gospel narrative. If we are asked to believe that the risen Jesus appeared in a spiritual body, we must have some apprehension of the nature and constitution of such a body. Does it consist of matter—transubstantiated matter, we may call it, but nevertheless matter, and therefore still under the laws which govern matter? If the Galilean women and disciples, and even the Pharisee Paul, had been asked this question, and could have understood its import as we do, they would doubtless have answered: "Yes, it was matter, though greatly refined and etherealized. This body could do what other bodies cannot do; but whatever it did was done under the laws which rule organic matter. The body moved with unusual ease and rapidity, and, perhaps, passed through substances which check the movement of ordinary bodies, but it existed in a limited

³⁴ H. Latham, *The Risen Master*, p. 74.

³⁵ H. B. Swete, *The Appearances of Our Lord after the Passion*, p. 50.

³⁶ *The Gospel of the Resurrection*, p. 162.

³⁷ *The Empty Tomb*, pp. 15-16.

³⁸ *Monist*, April, 1901, p. 393.

space, it was not ubiquitous; it reflected sunlight or lamplight, and was visible to eyes of flesh; it had organs of speech, and uttered words which were projected through the vibrating air to ears of flesh." We speak of the grosser and finer features in the incidents described in the Gospels, and reject or carefully explain the former that we may hold consistently the latter; but if there is a difference, it is merely one of degree. If the disciples saw a body and heard it speak, they were not inconsistent in regarding it as a body of flesh and bones, at least of the substance of which flesh and bones are made; it was the body of one who had returned to a limited, circumscribed life, conditioned by the laws and forces which govern nature. Nor is there any radical difference between these revelations and those made later to Stephen, to Paul, and to the writer of the Apocalypse. There is nothing which we know of the possibilities of matter which either forbids or justifies the hypothesis that such a body once revealed itself to the eyes and ears of men. But this idea does not seem to reach to the conception which Christian faith holds of its eternal and exalted Saviour. If we accept it, we must hold to this view of a life limited by a refined, transcendent, but material, body. If it is suggested that the body was not refined matter, but something else, of which we know nothing, we may be tempted to say: That is out of the range of our knowledge and of an intelligent faith. But a better answer lies at hand: If we believe that the Lord, after his crucifixion, had a body at all, it is because we accept the testimony of the witnesses, which testimony points decidedly to a body that made the impression of a material organism, and because nothing we have learned since justifies us in substituting anything else for this.

Difficulties of this kind have led some recent scholars to conclude that the spirit of Jesus did not return to an organized body of any kind. His disembodied spirit was present with his disciples, though perhaps not confined to those places where they chanced to be present. His communion with them was that of a spirit with spirits, and there was no need of bodily organs and faculties to connect these kindred spirits or to intervene between them. Even ordinary human spirits dwelling in the flesh, it is thought by some, may sometimes communicate impressions and thoughts to others, without appealing to physical organs, even when their bodies are

too far separated to make such appeal possible. If that is possible, it is thought that the spirit of Jesus, freed from earthly, material limitations, may have enlightened the minds, quickened the memories, and kindled the faith and courage of his disciples by direct action upon their spirits. Some have even ventured to suggest the possibility that modern research into certain striking phenomena which arouse the suspicion that spirits not dwelling in earthly bodies can commune with men, may throw some light upon the question. Lake says, "Phenomena have certainly been registered by observers of high scientific and moral position, which may point to the conclusion that men who were known to them personally, and died recently, are still capable of communicating with them."³⁹ Horn says that Weisse, Hülsman, and Fichte held to a spiritualistic power of the dead to recall themselves to the living.⁴⁰ Not many, however, have faith enough in this recent and occult science to appeal to it in support of what they term "the objective-vision hypothesis." This view was set forth in an able and impressive way by Keim⁴¹ some years ago. This seems to be the view of Stapfer,⁴² and of Lake,⁴³ Rolleston,⁴⁴ and E. A. Abbott.⁴⁵ The thought is that such deep and vivid impressions made upon the minds of the disciples by the spirit of Jesus would inevitably, in men of their ways of thinking, assume forms which would seem to be external to those who experienced them; the assurance of Jesus' presence would seem to be a vision of him appearing before the eyes, and the thoughts which he impressed upon their minds would express themselves in words uttered and heard. Even if experiences were not quite so vivid and realistic at the moment when they occurred, imaginative Orientals could not report them in any other than an objective way, which would inevitably become more graphic and detailed as it was repeated.

This view is, of course, rejected by those who hold that the empty grave furnishes essential witness to the fact of Jesus' re-

³⁹ *The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ*, p. 245.

⁴⁰ *Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift*, XIII, 475-476.

⁴¹ *Jesus of Nazara*, VI, 360-365.

⁴² *The Death and Resurrection of Jesus Christ*, p. 256.

⁴³ *The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ*, pp. 274-275.

⁴⁴ *Hibbert Journal*, IV, 637.

⁴⁵ *Apologia*, p. 75.

newed presence with his disciples; and some who do not regard that as a certainly established fact or as of vital doctrinal importance still regard this theory as a kind of makeshift, which does not fit well into the gospel stories. Bernhard Weiss ⁴⁶ and Rhees, ⁴⁷ while they do not accept the theory, think it not inconsistent with a true faith in the essential doctrine of the resurrection. The weight of any direct argument for it will best appear after we have considered the theory next presented and discussed.

The theory of subjective visions. This is founded upon the belief that, so far as objective realities are concerned, the disciples were in relations not radically different from those which surround other Christian men. God was, indeed, near them, as he is to all pious souls, and Jesus was the inspiration, the teacher and guide, that he is for all Christians; but he was no nearer to them than he is to all who love and follow him, and assumed no form through which to communicate with them which is not the means of communicating with others. The visions, then, were purely subjective; perfectly normal, in the sense that they sprang from those forces and were developed under those laws which pertain to the normal spiritual life of men. They can be explained without appeal to the miraculous, in the sense of that word which sets aside or interferes with the uniform action of God in the material or spiritual life of men. This is the view of Schmiedel, ⁴⁸ and his pupil Arno Neumann, ⁴⁹ and of Eck, ⁵⁰ and is most fully and ably discussed and defended by Arnold Meyer. ⁵¹ Some who seem to decide for a spiritual body or an objective vision seem to regard this as a possible explanation of the phenomena. Stapfer asks, "What . . . is the use of asking whether the visions were exterior or interior?" ⁵² Edwin A. Abbott, though he has said, "The body of Christ did not leave the tomb. But the spirit of the Savior came (according to the testimony of Paul) in visible form and with audible

⁴⁶ *Life of Christ*, III, 390.

⁴⁷ *Jesus of Nazareth*, p. 213.

⁴⁸ *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, IV, cols. 4080 f.

⁴⁹ *Jesus* (English translation), pp. 164-170.

⁵⁰ *Über die Bedeutung der Auferstehung Jesu für die Urgemeinde und für Uns*, p. 29.

⁵¹ *Die Auferstehung Christi*, pp. 290-315.

⁵² *The Death and the Resurrection of Jesus Christ*, p. 256.

voices not only to single persons—Peter, James, and Paul himself—but also to groups of disciples,” adds a few pages later: “As to the statement of my view, as being that ‘the belief in the resurrection of Christ was based on certain visions,’ it is correct, but I should prefer to state it differently: ‘*It was based on the personality of Christ, and on spiritual or psychological laws.*’” “When dead to the eyes of the flesh, He appeared to the eyes of their spirits and dwelt permanently in their hearts.”⁵³ One cannot doubt that one main argument which draws towards this conclusion is the modern shyness in accepting the miraculous; or—to put it more affirmatively and religiously, and really more justly and accurately—the disposition to believe that God’s ways in both the material and spiritual administration of the world are uniform. No age has ever been more ready than ours to recognize that strange and mysterious things happen—things not easily explained by our present knowledge of the forces active in the world. But when these things are recognized, it is not the habit of thoughtful men of this age to attribute them without further inquiry to some divine interposition, breaking in upon the established course of divine providence or grace. This is not an irreligious, nor even a sceptical state of mind; it is, at least in many cases, profoundly religious, based on faith, not on unbelief—faith in the infinite wisdom and power and the immutability of God. It is not due to a loss of faith in the uniqueness and the supremacy of Christ, but rather to confidence in him as truly the Son of God, who entered into God’s order, respected his laws, and from first to last illustrated in a supreme way the spirit and method in which the children of God should accept and interpret God’s ways with men. Now men who cultivate this spirit, when they read the records of the New Testament, cannot avoid the inquiry, Is there not at least some tentative, hypothetical way of explaining even the most wonderful parts of these records which recognizes them as illustrations and expressions of God’s uniform ways with men?

No one can attempt to explain eclipses, diseases, cures, striking historical events, religious movements and experiences, in this way, and then, when he studies the New Testament, neglect or

⁵³ *Apologia*, pp. 75, 79, 80.

reject his method. To do that would, sooner or later, throw the New Testament out of the realm of serious studies. It will not do, either, to begin by accepting its statements, literally interpreted, and then simply to attempt to justify them to modern ways of thinking. That would be only half serious. The student of the New Testament must, like every other student of history or ancient literature, strive to get behind the record, and discover, so far as possible, the underlying facts. It is this irresistible tendency which has forced some modern scholars to raise the question whether the conviction which arose in the minds of certain persons that they had seen the Lord Jesus alive after his death and burial, may not be accounted for by an appeal to forces and laws which are uniform in human life.

It is a well-known fact that seeing visions is a common experience among people who have active, imaginative minds, especially among those who have deep religious experiences and intense spiritual desires. The disciples of Jesus belonged to a race which was controlled by such experiences and desires. The Old Testament records many such visions, described in very vivid and realistic terms; and other literature of Jewish origin, especially the apocalypses, abound in such descriptions.

In some cases this may be simply a literary device; but even in those cases its literary value is due to the fact that it appeals to the imagination as real and objective. In many cases, moreover, the seer, or the writer who recorded his visions, must have thought of the scenes described as having some kind of objective reality. Whatever may have been the first impression which lies behind the story of the appearance of the dead Samuel to the woman of Endor, the vision of horses and chariots of fire seen by Elisha's servant, and Isaiah's magnificent vision in the sixth chapter of his prophecy, there can be no doubt that the descriptions given of these scenes were regarded as recording something that was real and objective. The same was doubtless true of the various accounts of the appearance of angels who were seen by men, and conversed and even ate with them. Nor are such scenes confined to the earlier records of the Old Testament. Three of the disciples are reported to have seen Moses and Elijah on a mountain, conversing with their Master; dead saints leave

their tombs and appear to many (Matt. 27 53); Peter sees a sheet laden with animals descend from heaven; Paul beholds a man from Macedonia appearing to him at Troas and inviting him to come to Macedonia; he also has interviews with Jesus, not only on the Damascus way but in other places and at other times. The dying Stephen beholds the Son of Man standing on the right hand of God; and the Lord converses with Ananias. Angels are often seen, sometimes acting on material substances, such as rolling a stone, opening prison doors, smiting a man with death, singing, and conversing with men. Some of these descriptions may be intended as graphic figures or metaphors; but even then the significance of such figures is due to the belief in a reality which suggests them. There can be no doubt that those who recorded such instances frequently believed that they were relating objective facts; and we have every reason to believe that those who had such experiences viewed them as due to the visible and audible presence of the beings to whom they ascribe them.

If there are cases, as in the apocalypses and elsewhere, where it was not the intention to describe in literal terms an objective reality, even such cases may aid in interpreting the sections of the New Testament now under discussion. There can be no question that in ancient and modern times men of glowing imaginations often relate their experiences and express their convictions in this form of poetic and imaginative description. Jeremiah *sees* two baskets of figs set before the temple; Jesus *sees* Satan as lightning fallen from heaven; and the author of the Apocalypse *sees* the scenes of the future which he describes. The feature appears even in modern religious writings. F. B. Meyer thus describes a decisive experience in his own religious life. He was walking among the hills at Keswick in the night, depressed over his religious state, when—to quote his own words—“A voice said to me: ‘As you took forgiveness from the hand of the dying Christ, take the Holy Ghost from the hand of the living Christ.’ I turned to Christ and said: ‘Lord, as I breathe in this whiff of warm night air, so I breathe into every part of me the blessed Spirit.’” A little later he says: “I turned to leave the mountain side, and as I went down the tempter said: ‘You have got nothing. It is moonshine.’ I

said: 'I have.' He said: 'Do you feel it?' 'I do not.' 'Then, if you do not feel it, you have not got it.' I said: 'I do not feel it, but I reckon that God is faithful, and he could not have brought a hungry soul to claim by faith, and then give a stone for bread, and a scorpion for a fish. I know I have got it because God led me to claim.'" ⁵⁴ There is nothing more realistic or objective in the reports of conversations between the disciples and the risen Christ. Is it not possible that the experiences which lie behind the formal conversations recorded in the Gospels were somewhat like that which marked the crisis in the life of Mr. Meyer?

A still more striking illustration of this habit of describing what are believed to be real experiences may be found in Burkhardt's interesting and suggestive book upon the resurrection of the Lord. He does not hesitate to give lengthy accounts of the appearances of Jesus to Peter, James, and the mother of Jesus. These scenes are realistic in detail, as if they were reports from eye-witnesses. Those scenes which appear in the Gospels, and the words which are recorded there, are reconstructed; Jesus is made to say to the women, "Fear ye not; but only renew your trust in me. I am actually the same whom ye long ago had learned to know as your Saviour." Salome is reported as saying to Peter, "We have for thee an entirely special commission: when the angel showed us the empty grave he said," etc. ⁵⁵ This is entirely honest and simple-minded; but if Herr Burkhardt had written his book in the first century, instead of at the end of the nineteenth, it would have opened up many interesting and perplexing questions for New Testament critics. But is this way of relating deep experiences, this habit of attributing to actors in significant events words and situations which spring from the imagination of the narrator, something new to story tellers? Is it reasonable to recognize this feature and make allowance for it in the discourse or writing of a modern Christian, but unscientific to expect to find and seek to detect the same characteristic in the writings of the Evangelists? Indeed, when we

⁵⁴ A Castaway, p. 96.

⁵⁵ Die Auferstehung des Herrn und seine Erscheinungen, pp. 99, 119, 120.

compare one Gospel with another and with the extant fragments of early uncanonical gospels, we see that the same spirit and method ruled in those days. Each writer felt at liberty to recast the tradition which came into his hands; to add from other sources, or, apparently, like the excellent Herr Burkhardt, from his own vivid imagination; to omit what he did not care to repeat, and to change words and sentences in what he retained. We cannot now dissect out of these stories that which was their original form, their primitive germ; we cannot know just what the first experience of those who saw the Lord was; but we can recognize the probability that it was something simpler, perhaps less objective, than appears in the stories which went from lip to lip for many a year before they were recorded in their present form, or which, if you please, lay in the brooding, fructifying memory of one or two intense, imaginative men, who finally wrote them down, not as dry annalists, but with the fervor of spiritual and poetic genius.

But there must have been a germ; there must have been real, primitive experiences, from which these narratives and the great spiritual movement which preserved them and gave them form, sprang. The scientific temper of our own age forbids us to believe that great convictions and great movements spring from nothing, or from vain superstition and foolish blunders. The men who said that they had seen the Lord, and retained this conviction through years of labor and persecution, and convinced others that they were right, and thus founded and inspired the church of Christ, could not have been mistaken in the real, spiritual substance of this conviction. They had a foundation for their belief quite as good as an empty tomb, a human form seen moving about, and words that set the air in vibration; better, perhaps, than a localized, limited, spiritual presence, which impressed itself upon their sensorium or upon their souls. What may that have been? It may have been the focalizing, or the bursting into life, of experiences and convictions which had found lodgement in their souls through many a day. They were Jews, accepting without doubt the Pharisaic belief in the immortality of souls and the resurrection of the dead; from their earliest youth they had believed that the Messiah was to come and redeem Israel;

they had come to a strong belief in Jesus as the promised Messiah; they thought that the time was near when he would reveal his power and establish his kingdom; they had heard him predict temporary disaster, perhaps death, for himself; but with these predictions there was the promise also that he would surely return to take up again his task and complete it. The words in which these predictions were recorded in the Gospels may be more definite than those which the Master spoke, but it is hardly to be doubted that he gave such assurances. The disciples were not prepared, indeed, for the dreadful catastrophe; when it fell, it shocked and stunned them. But what was more natural, more in accord with God's ways with men and the normal processes of human souls, than that first one and then another should react from this crushing blow, and should recover the faith which had been planted and nourished in their souls? They could not doubt that their Lord's spirit still lived, and that he would take up again and perfect the work to which he had given himself, and which he had often promised to carry to its perfection. Faith, not hopelessness, was normal for them, and they sprang back into their normal state. Moreover, their natural, perhaps their only, way of conceiving of the return of Jesus to his task was through his resurrection. "The Spirit was not yet," we are told by one of the Evangelists; the capacity to lay hold of their Lord as a purely incorporeal presence had not yet developed; they must think of him as in a body revealed to their eyes; the words which echoed in their hearts seemed to sound in their ears, and they could not report such experiences without putting them in this form. Furthermore, if one or more of those who had these experiences began to relate them in that way, not only the spiritual experience but the form of apprehending and relating it would be contagious. If Simon Peter or Mary Magdalene said, with glowing face and ardent tones, "I have seen the Lord, and he has spoken to me," others would almost inevitably have similar visions. One knows little of the history of religious ecstasies who objects that, while experiences of this kind might occur in a single soul, they could not be shared by a group of a dozen, or five hundred, people.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Arnold Meyer, *Die Auferstehung Christi*, pp. 217-272.

It was remarked in the Acts of the Apostles that Jesus appeared, "not to all the people, but unto witnesses who were chosen before of God," and many recent writers upon the resurrection have called attention to the fact that, with one notable exception to be considered later, there are no witnesses except those who had already become his disciples. Those who most confidently defend the doctrine of a bodily resurrection are impressed with this fact. Horn thinks it was due to the fact that the eyes of others "were holden";⁵⁷ David Smith holds that the risen body "was invisible to the natural eye," and could be seen only by those "endowed with spiritual vision";⁵⁸ Simpson observes, "If it be true that the eye sees precisely what it brings with it the power to see, perception will vary with receptivity";⁵⁹ and Skrine declares, "Only those who had love could be in the life-relation with Christ. Given this love, the sense-perception becomes possible."⁶⁰ Latham says, "This body was rendered cognizable by human senses—touch as well as sight—when He so would have it, and only then."⁶¹

These various views and conjectures all rest upon the conviction that the apprehension of the risen Master was, in some way, subjective and visionary: it was not simply the ordinary observation of an objective reality, but was due to a peculiar state of mind in the observers. Such explanations approximate the hypothesis of subjective visions, and raise the question whether it is not reasonable to attribute to the mental and spiritual condition of the witnesses even more than these scholars attribute.

The case of the Apostle Paul is, indeed, in some degree exceptional. He had not been a follower of Jesus; and we cannot suppose that, on his way to Damascus, his heart was controlled by faith in him and passionate desire to see him. But Paul had a genuine Pharisee's belief in the future life and the resurrection of the dead, and he had an intense longing for the redemption of his people; he doubtless fully believed in revelations from the

⁵⁷ *Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift*, XIII, 359.

⁵⁸ *The Days of His Flesh*, p. 524.

⁵⁹ *Our Lord's Resurrection*, p. 116.

⁶⁰ *Contemporary Review*, December, 1904, p. 865.

⁶¹ *The Risen Master*, p. 22.

world beyond, and he was, as we know, a man predisposed to visionary experiences; his religious life did not satisfy his soul, and he had had for some months a contact with Christians which must have left deep impressions upon his mind, and kindled feelings of regret and restless longing; we are told that he stood by when the martyr Stephen cried aloud, "Behold, I see the heavens opened, and the Son of man standing on the right hand of God." He, too, had had his preparation for a vision of Christ; and the reaction and revulsion of feeling are quite as normal as the propulsion which acted upon other witnesses. (See Schmiedel,⁶² von Dobschütz,⁶³ Schwartzkopff,⁶⁴ Eck.⁶⁵)

The experience of Charles G. Finney in this, as in some other respects, closely resembles that of Paul. Until the time of his conversion, he seems to have been nearly as ignorant of Christ, if not as hostile to him, as was Saul of Tarsus. He thus describes his own experience at the time of his conversion:

There was no fire, and no light, in the room; nevertheless it appeared to me as if it were perfectly light. As I went in and shut the door after me, it seemed as if I met the Lord Jesus Christ face to face. It did not occur to me then, nor did it for some time afterward, that it was wholly a mental state. On the contrary it seemed to me that I saw him as I would see any other man. He said nothing, but looked at me in such a manner as to break me right down at his feet. . . . It seemed to me a reality, that he stood before me, and I fell down at his feet and poured out my soul to him.

Of a later experience he says:

The day was just beginning to dawn. But all at once a light perfectly ineffable shone in my soul, that almost prostrated me to the ground. . . . This light seemed to be like the brightness of the sun in every direction. It was too intense for my eyes. . . . I think I knew something then, by

⁶² *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, IV, col. 4081.

⁶³ *Ostern und Pfingsten*, p. 25.

⁶⁴ *The Prophecies of Jesus Christ relating to His Death, Resurrection and Second Coming*, pp. 101-104.

⁶⁵ *Über die Bedeutung der Auferstehung Jesu für die Urgemeinde und für Uns*, pp. 13-17.

actual experience, of that light that prostrated Paul on his way to Damascus.⁶⁶

The fact is, as one of the sturdy advocates of a bodily resurrection says: The "ultimate belief [of the disciples] did not rest upon outward or circumstantial evidence, but upon intuitive insight, upon the conviction that had grown up in them from their having lived with their Master." "The belief which our Lord wanted His followers to possess was to come mainly from within; the supports from without were only subordinate."⁶⁷ But if we find our confidence in those supports from without growing weak by reason of the conceptions of God's ways of dealing with his world and his children which we are forced to accept, must those evidences which come from within fail, or suffer serious loss? We should be poor indeed if our faith in Christ, in his doctrine and his scheme of life, in his purpose and his promise to redeem the souls of men, in his revelation of the heavenly Father's love and the Holy Spirit's constant ministry to men, rested upon such evidence as we possess that his grave was deserted on the third day, and his body, transmuted into some strange substance which both submitted to and transcended the laws which govern organic matter, was seen and heard to speak, and finally vanished in the clouds. These narratives have doubtless enlisted the attention and commanded and strengthened the faith of many people. But vital truth is not in the forms in which it expresses itself, but in the deep, irresistible response which spirit gives to spirit. The forms must change that the truth may live and continue to produce its fruit. Perhaps Christianity would not have gained its earliest conquests without the Easter message, "The Lord hath risen indeed, and hath appeared to Simon." But it does not follow from this that the faith which that message expressed may not survive and grow strong after the formal conception expressed by those who first uttered these words has been adjusted to other views of the relation of the eternal spirit of Christ to a bodily organism. It may be doubtful whether Jesus would have made his connections with the men of his time if his first disciples

⁶⁶ *Memoirs of Rev. Charles G. Finney*, pp. 19, 20, 34.

⁶⁷ H. Latham, *The Risen Master*, pp. 74, 75.

had not taken him as the Jewish Messiah. But for how long was that interpretation of him and his mission of real significance to his church? The name, in a Greek translation, was retained, but the nature and functions of the Jewish Messiah were obliterated in interpretations which came in part from Greek philosophy but in the main from his own moral and spiritual transcendence, so that, by a strange transmutation, even the term which described an anointed prince or leader has come to denote to many an eternal hypostasis in the divine being. It may be questioned whether Christianity would have so rapidly won its place and so fully inspired men if it had not proclaimed that Christ was soon to come again on the clouds of heaven, to raise those who were in their graves, to judge the world, and to establish his kingdom. But the years and centuries have passed without this stupendous catastrophe, and the church has lived on, adjusting its views to the demands of history; and, though the form of its apprehension has changed, it still lives by its faith in the triumph of Christ and his kingdom. There is no article of the Christian faith which rests upon the conviction that Jesus left the grave and revealed himself in visible and audible form to a few people during a few days or weeks. As several recent writers have acknowledged or affirmed, the doctrine of immortality does not rest upon the evidence that Jesus was seen alive after his burial. (See Rolleston,⁶⁸ Riegenbach,⁶⁹ Arnold Meyer,⁷⁰ Fenn,⁷¹ and others.) The supremacy or divinity of the Lord Jesus is not dependent upon the establishment of this as a fact, nor is the hope of the ultimate triumph of his kingdom of righteousness in the earth. Our faith in these things rests in Jesus himself, in what he taught and what he did and what he showed himself to be, not in one experience through which he passed. Indeed, the belief that he was raised from the dead rests upon the impression which his life and teachings have made; and no one would be able, or would care, to defend the story of his resurrection, except from faith in his transcendent nature and worth. The question presses whether

⁶⁸ Hibbert Journal, IV, 631.

⁶⁹ Die Auferstehung Jesu, p. 36.

⁷⁰ Die Auferstehung Christi, p. 332.

⁷¹ American Journal of Theology, XII (1908), 565.

the Christian faith gains anything in power to convince the mind or to inspire the soul by striving to make the evidence that Jesus' body was raised to life a connecting link between his own spiritual being and the spirits of believers.

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*THE INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIANITY UPON
THE ROMAN EMPIRE*

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It has commonly been taken for granted that Christianity must have had a great and beneficent influence upon the Roman Empire, within which it had its origin and whose official religion it finally became. This not unnatural assumption is, however, very difficult to substantiate. One may recognize that the religion of Christ was a great advance upon the paganism of antiquity, and that its final victory was a blessing to the world, and yet find it far from easy to show how and to what extent the Roman world was benefited by it. It is simple enough to point to individual lives within the Christian church that were purified and helped. But to prove that the common level of life within the Empire was raised, that society at large was bettered, that the general moral standard was elevated, that political principles and civil institutions and economic ideals were improved by its influence, is altogether another matter. It is not enough to content ourselves with the assumption that Christianity being in itself a good thing must have been good for the Roman world; it is incumbent upon us to show that it actually proved so.

If this is to be done, it would seem necessary first of all to show that the Empire was better in its later days, after it had felt for centuries the leaven of Christianity, than it was before the new religion appeared upon the scene. It is notoriously difficult to compare the life of one age with that of another and determine with which the advantage lies. So much depends upon the temperament and point of view of those observers whose comments upon their own times have happened to come down to us that it is almost impossible to speak with assurance. And yet we know enough about the Roman Empire, early and late, to be rea-

sonably confident that no general and permanent improvement, political, economic, social, and moral, marked its history from the second century on; that is, from the earliest date when Christianity may be supposed to have exerted an influence upon its life. The notion that the Empire was steadily declining during all this period may be exaggerated, but it is in general true. Chrysostom and Jerome and Augustine and Orosius and Salvian may in their Christian zeal paint contemporary morals blacker than the facts warrant. But the Christian apologetic undertaken by Augustine in his *City of God* and by Orosius in his *History of the World* shows that there was general agreement both among Christians and pagans that the Empire was growing steadily worse instead of better; and no one can read Salvian's work on the *Government of God* and the poems *Conjugis ad Uxorem* and *De Providentia Divina* ascribed to Prosper of Aquitaine without realizing that, even though the pictures may be overdrawn, conditions were as bad as they had ever been, if not worse. All the evidence of the period goes to show that in the political world order was increasingly giving way to chaos, and that economically the Empire was on the down grade; while socially and morally there was at any rate no improvement sufficiently marked or general to leave any traces. Such writings as those of Symmachus, Ausonius, and Apollinaris Sidonius show that there was still domestic virtue in the world in the fourth and fifth centuries, as there was in the age of Pliny, and political honor, as in the days of Cato; but society at large seems to have been no better, if it was not worse, than in earlier times.

In certain respects it is true there was a difference easily observable. Christian monasticism, unknown in the first century, had spread far and near both in East and West before the fifth century, and society was unquestionably widely affected by it. Here we have a direct fruit of Christianity. It is true that monasticism has had a large development in other religions as well. It neither took its rise originally within the Christian church nor has Christianity had a monopoly of it, but Christian monasticism was a native development on Christian soil, the natural result of principles which existed within the church as early even as the time of Paul. Quite apart, however, from the question of its origin,

it may well be doubted whether its growing prevalence in the early centuries of the Christian era was really a benefit to the Roman Empire. It argued the wide-spread existence of a certain form of religious devotion and moral heroism, but it argued also an all too common moral weakness. The impulse to leave the world, to turn one's back upon its pleasures, its occupations, its responsibilities, and its opportunities, sometimes meant strength, sometimes the lack of it. It might be due to moral enthusiasm or to mere pessimism and thwarted desires. It did undoubtedly tend to promote the ideal of personal purity and sexual morality, though the influence even here was not always as uplifting as it might have been—witness for instance many of the letters of Jerome. The spectacle of the life of celibacy and chastity practised by an ever-increasing number of men and women must impress beholders with the importance of purity; but on the other hand the contempt, either tacit or avowed, thrown by the whole movement upon family life, and the notion that the highest thing a man could do was to separate himself from neighbors and friends, from the world and all its interests, rather than to devote himself to the service of his fellows and to the improvement of society and the state, could hardly fail to be pernicious. Instead of enlisting the religious and moral enthusiasm of the age for the betterment of society, monasticism turned much of that enthusiasm into an altogether different channel, and diminished rather than multiplied the forces making for the transformation of this world into the kingdom of God.

Another marked difference between the earlier and later Empire was the gradual decrease in the number of slaves and the diminishing importance of the slave class in the life of the Roman world. Whether Christianity had anything to do with this decline in the institution of slavery is doubtful. It is true that the overthrow of slavery is commonly attributed to the Christian church, but it was not overthrown in the Roman world. The institution was still firmly intrenched in the later Empire, even though the relative number of slaves was less than in earlier days. Christianity in the days of the Roman Empire made no protest against slavery. Christians accepted it without question, just as they accepted the state, the prevailing differences in social rank, and

the common inequalities in economic conditions. They preached the principle of Christian brotherhood, but they no more thought of putting an end to slavery than they thought of destroying private property. Attempts might be made—as they often were, by pagans as well as Christians—to ameliorate the suffering and distress which slavery often caused, but of a war upon the institution itself nobody thought. In Stoicism the principle of human brotherhood and equality was preached before Christianity and independently of it; and under its influence there were pagans here and there who freed their slaves, as there were Christians who did the same under the influence of the like Christian principle. As the idea and practice of penance grew within the church, the manumission of slaves took its place with the giving of alms and other forms of self-sacrifice as a means of making atonement for one's sins. Moreover, the general hostility of the more ascetic Christians to luxury and display voiced itself occasionally in denunciation of the practice of holding large numbers of slaves, as in attacks upon large possessions of any kind.¹ But the practice of manumission was not new, and it is by no means certain that it was more common in the Christian than in the pagan Empire. In any case it did not mean the condemnation of slavery or the destruction of it as an institution. As a matter of fact, the church itself, after it had become a legalized corporation within the Roman Empire, was a large holder of slaves, as of other kinds of property.

The attitude of the leaders of the church from Paul on was such as to confirm rather than to destroy slavery. Christians were not to desire a change in their earthly condition. They were to accept their lot in life, whether bond or free, without complaint, and were to realize that they were all at the same time freedmen of the Lord and bond-servants of Christ. There was inculcated the same indifference towards one's condition in this respect as in all respects. It was not for a change in their earthly lot or a betterment of their worldly state that Christians were to seek, but for righteousness and eternal salvation. The church, to be sure, preached the brotherhood of all Christians in Christ,

¹ See Chrysostom, Homily xl, 5, on First Corinthians, who thinks two or three slaves enough for anybody.

but this was not commonly interpreted to mean the abolition of slavery or even any criticism of it as an institution. Christian brotherhood was to manifest itself in mutual kindness, forgiveness, forbearance, and charity. Christian masters were to treat their slaves mercifully, and Christian slaves were to be faithful and dutiful to their masters. Thus the Christian spirit was to find expression both among bond and free, but an equality of condition or estate in this world it was not supposed to involve. How the idea of Christian brotherhood and the equality of all Christians before God could consist with the continuance of slavery is suggested, for instance, in Augustine's *City of God*, where the realization of the Christian ideal is put in heaven rather than on earth.²

The real secret of the growing decline of slavery in the Roman Empire—a decline which began already in its early days before the Gospel had gained a hearing and a following—is to be found not in the influence of Christianity but in changed economic conditions. The political revolution resulting in the establishment of the Empire was but one phase of a larger social revolution which expressed itself in the increasing power of the commercial and industrial classes of the community and the growing displacement of the old landed aristocracy. Slavery could not possibly flourish under the new social conditions as it had under the old, and the steady decline of the institution and the steady increase of free labor were inevitable. Then, too, as the conquests of Rome in the world outside ceased, the supply of slaves diminished; and later, as wealth decreased, and particularly as the great estates of earlier days fell into decay, the ability to hold slaves in large numbers was lessened, and manumission often became an economic necessity. To attribute to Christianity any controlling influence in this general and inevitable process is altogether to mistake the situation.³

One more notable change in the life of the later Empire is the

² See Book xix, chap. 10 ff; especially chapters 15 and 16.

³ See the admirable essay by Overbeck, "Ueber die Verhältniss der alten Kirche zur Sklaverei im Römischen Reiche," in his *Studien zur Geschichte der alten Kirche*, pp. 158 ff., and Dill's *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*, p. 251 ff.

growing disrepute and final disappearance of the gladiatorial combats which formed so important a part of the public amusements of the Roman populace. This change, too, is commonly attributed to the influence of Christianity, and is said to be the fruit of the new emphasis which the Christians were laying upon the value of human life. In 325 the Emperor Constantine issued an edict prohibiting gladiatorial combats in time of peace (Theodosian Code, xv, 12, 1). Efforts had often been made by the government to regulate the sport and to reduce its dimensions, but this was apparently the first attempt to put a stop to it. That Constantine was led to issue his edict by the influence of Christianity is implied by Eusebius (*Vita Constantini*, iv, 25), and is commonly taken for granted by historians. But it should be noticed that it is not against gladiatorial combats in particular that the early Fathers directed their attacks, but against theatrical performances and public shows in general; the principal ground of offence being, not cruelty, but worldliness, licentiousness, and particularly the idolatry in which all the shows were involved (see, for instance, Tertullian's *De Spectaculis*). It may well be doubted, indeed, whether the early Christians in general actually attached any higher value to human life than their pagan contemporaries. Murder they regarded as a mortal sin, but so did every moralist of the age; and the notion of the sacredness and inviolability of human personality as such, which commonly underlies modern sentiment upon the subject, was as foreign to the Christian Fathers as to most of their contemporaries. Other sports and spectacles which Christian moralists denounced as vigorously as gladiatorial combats, Constantine apparently made no effort to suppress; and it may well be that in this case some other motive than Christianity moved him to the action he took. Gladiatorial shows were a survival of the age when Rome had large numbers of barbarian captives to draw upon for such purposes, and it may have seemed to a man of Constantine's wisdom, who was not afraid to break with old customs of which he did not approve, and who was interested to re-establish the peace of the Empire and to develop its resources, that such shows were bad both economically and socially. It is interesting to notice that it is only the occurrence of gladiatorial contests in times of

peace that seems to trouble him. He did not succeed in putting an end to them; they were still common later in the fourth century, at any rate in the West (compare the interesting account in Augustine's *Confessions*, vi, 8). According to Theodoret (*Church History*, v, 26) they were suppressed by Honorius in 404, and after that time we actually hear nothing more of them, though combats with beasts, often as bloody and almost as dangerous to human life as the gladiatorial contests, still continued, and the old theatrical performances, against which the Fathers, early and late, protested so vigorously, were apparently as popular and as largely attended as ever.

There are other lines along which it is commonly claimed that Christianity affected the Roman world for good. Thus it is said that it had large influence in promoting charity and in the establishment of public institutions of mercy such as hospitals, asylums, and houses of refuge of one kind and another. Undoubtedly this assertion is justified by the facts. From the very beginning, the Fathers laid emphasis on charity as a leading Christian virtue, insisting that Christians were under obligation to assist and befriend their fellow-disciples in all possible ways. And as the theory and practice of penance developed in the second and following centuries, charity became with prayer and fasting one of the principal means of securing atonement for one's sins. As Augustine remarks, almsgiving and fasting are the two wings upon which prayer flies to God. That this idea promoted the exercise of charity, particularly within the circle of Christian brotherhood, and that it did much to relieve suffering and distress, there can be no doubt. Such a work as Uhlhorn's *Christian Charity* gives abundant information, and in Harnack's *Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries* there is an admirable and sympathetic presentation of the whole matter (Book ii, chapter 3).

It should not be imagined, indeed, that the pagan world was unfamiliar with philanthropy. Many of the great pagan moralists preached humanitarian principles of a high order, and humanitarian impulses existed then as always in civilized nations, and found expression in many private and public charities. At the same time it cannot be doubted that Christianity did much to

promote and foster such philanthropy. And although the interest of Christians was chiefly confined to relieving the necessities of their own Christian brethren, either by giving them work or helping them when they could not work, yet not infrequently, especially in times of public calamity, their good offices transcended the bounds of the church and took in the pagan world outside. The mutual love of Christian brethren and their exercise of charity toward those in need attracted the attention of pagan observers, and doubtless was one of the most engaging features of Christianity, especially to the poorer classes, and one of the most effective means of propaganda among them.

But there is another and less agreeable side to the matter. We come frequently upon the notion that charity is for the sake, not of the one that receives, but of the one that dispenses it; and the tendency of this idea was naturally to tolerate poverty, and to think of it with considerable complacency because it provided Christians with the opportunity of gaining merit for themselves by coming to its relief.⁴ Christian charity was not always directed toward the betterment of the condition of those whom it helped. The effect upon them was often a matter of indifference. The result of this kind of charity could in the long run only be disastrous economically and socially. The exercise of charity is in itself a beautiful thing, but, unless it looks consciously and intelligently to the permanent improvement of the lives of those it helps and to the ultimate removal of the conditions which make it necessary, it is inevitably pauperizing and economically demoralizing. That this was actually one of the results of the victory of Christianity within the Roman Empire there can scarcely be room for doubt. Poverty and suffering, at any rate within the Christian church, were relieved on a scale not seen before. And for this all credit is to be given to those Christians who thus manifested the spirit of Christian brotherhood. But that the Roman world at large and Roman civilization in general were permanently benefited more than harmed by this development is not altogether certain.

Again the influence of Christianity in elevating the position of

⁴See e.g. Cyprian, *On Work and Alms*; Chrysostom, *On Penance*, Hom. iii and vi; Salvian, *Against Avarice*.

woman and in promoting the sanctity and purity of home life is often referred to. But there is no evidence that the position of woman was appreciably higher in the later than in the earlier days of the Roman Empire. Her status under the Empire, both early and late, was better than it had once been. Her emancipation had begun long before the opening of the Christian era. But of a marked change between the first and fourth Christian centuries we have no knowledge. The idea of the equality of all Christians in the sight of God had probably as much influence in this regard as in the matter of slavery, but no more. And, on the other hand, the prevailing ascetic character of the Christianity of the age could not fail to react unfavorably at least in some respects upon the general estimate of woman and of her place in the world. Not simply was unchastity denounced as the worst of sins, but marriage itself was regarded as morally on a lower plane than celibacy and as little better than a concession to human weakness (see 1 Corinthians 7 9, which is simply an anticipation of the common patristic attitude on the subject). Such an opinion was hardly calculated to promote the dignity of woman, who was thus looked upon chiefly as a temptation to sin, and as a creature to be avoided by all who wished to live lives of special holiness. The effects of this ascetic spirit upon home life cannot have been altogether beneficial. Doubtless the vigorous and persistent campaign against sins of the flesh had good results; though the complacency of so noble a Christian woman as Monica toward the illicit relation sustained for many years by her son Augustine shows that the general standard of morality was not very different at the end of the fourth century from the beginning of the first. Many were undoubtedly kept from immorality by the influence of Christian principles; but the effect of the church's long insistence upon chastity as the supreme virtue seems to have been almost as much to break up the home by sending men and women into monasteries and convents as to promote the sanctity of the home itself and the purity of the marriage relationship.

It should not be overlooked in this connection that in the matter of divorce and remarriage the church took a strict position, and

threw the weight of its influence against the all-too-lax marriage laws of the Empire. But it is interesting to notice that this was not so much for the sake of preserving the sanctity of home and of the marriage bond as to hinder second marriages, which were regarded by many Fathers, even when the first marriage had been dissolved by death, as little better than adultery. Their teaching was, not that the marriage bond has eternal significance, but that to marry at all is less noble than to remain a celibate, and to marry twice is still worse.⁵ Ultimately, when marriage had come to be regarded as a sacrament—a development foreshadowed by the custom, which arose as early as the second century, of bringing Christian marriages under the control of the church—divorce leading to remarriage was prohibited altogether as a profanation of a sacred bond. But this belongs to a later period.

If, then, we can constitute with certainty no general and marked improvement in the social conditions of the Roman Empire the credit for which can be given unquestionably to Christianity, may we at least claim that the later Empire would have been much worse than it really was, had it not been for Christianity? This is a common assumption among historians. If the Roman Empire was not appreciably better in the fifth century than in the first, at least it would have been much worse had not Christianity exercised a restraining and conserving influence. Of course, in the very nature of the case, this opinion can neither be proved nor disproved. What might have been had Christianity not appeared upon the scene we can at best only conjecture. But the opinion is based upon a conception of the nature and purposes of the Christianity of that day whose soundness may be tested. Were the purposes and the ideals of Christianity, as it existed within the Roman world, of such a sort as to justify us in assuming that it must have constituted a preserving and conserving social force, that because of it the Empire lasted longer and was actually better than would otherwise have been the case? The investigation of this question will bring us nearer an answer to our general problem. We shall be in a better position to determine what Christianity actually did for the Roman Empire when we know what it tried

⁵ See Tertullian, *Ad Uxorem*, Book i; Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*, Book iii, chap. 1; Augustine, *De Bono Viduitatis*, etc.

to do; when we know what it was that its adherents, and particularly its leaders, set before themselves as their great end.

One of the most striking things about the early Christians is their almost total lack of social interests and ideals. The gospel of Jesus was pre-eminently a social gospel, but in the hands of his followers it lost its social emphasis and became individualistic and other-worldly to the last degree. Jesus was interested to promote the Kingdom of God, the reign of the spirit of brotherhood here and now. But to his immediate disciples the Kingdom was merely a future reality, to be established after the close of the present world. They lived wholly in the future, striving for nothing in the present except to prepare their friends and neighbors for the consummation by inducing them to repent and accept Jesus as the Messiah.

In the hands of Paul, Christianity became a means of redemption from sin. All men are evil, and doomed to destruction. Becoming united to Christ by faith, they are transformed from corrupt to holy beings, from sinners to saints, and are freed from death and made possessors of eternal life. The Christian is a supernatural being, superior to and separate from the things of this world, living still in the flesh to be sure, but waiting and yearning for his release from it and his enjoyment of the true life of the spirit in another sphere. Paul had large views about the conversion of the Roman Empire and the subjection of all things to the authority of Christ, but the world as he viewed it was essentially evil, and salvation, for Romans as well as Jews, lay only in escape from it by the power of the indwelling Spirit. He learned from Christ to make love the supreme virtue of the Christian life. It is in love for one's fellows, and particularly for one's Christian brethren, that the spirit of Christ in the disciple chiefly manifests itself. But even so, it is not in the improvement of social conditions, or in the promotion of the welfare of human life in this world, that he is interested. Love has significance rather for the one who loves than for the one who is loved. Its value lies not so much in what it effects as in what it expresses. And, in spite of Paul's emphasis upon love, and his assertion of its supreme place in Christian character, the subjection of the flesh to the spirit, manifesting itself in personal purity and holiness, is

equally essential. In fact, it is just this domination of the natural by the supernatural in the life of the individual in which salvation really consists. Paul was not an ascetic in any strict sense, but his underlying principle was ascetic in its tendency, and he showed distinctly ascetic leaning at times; and it is not an accident, nor is it due to the example of other movements, that asceticism early developed within the Christian church. The contrasts which Paul drew between the spirit and the flesh, between divine and human nature, between holiness and sin, between this world and another, all promoted the idea that the Christian life consists primarily in separation from this world and its interests, and in abstinence from its pleasures and indulgences. It was under the influence of his teaching that the author of the First Epistle of John wrote: "Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world. If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him. For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the vain-glory of life, is not of the Father, but is of the world. And the world passeth away and the lust thereof." From men dominated by such a conception as this little could be expected in the way of social service, or of effort for the amelioration of earthly conditions, economic, civil, or political. A man might be a useful citizen, he might interest himself in public affairs and devote his time and attention to the general good; but if he did, it was rather in spite of his Christianity than because of it. It was just this absence of public spirit, this indifference to the present because of absorption in the future, this disregard for or even hatred of earth because of love of heaven, that constituted the chief fault of Christianity in the eyes of its more intelligent opponents. Instead of making a man a better citizen and a more efficient public servant, Christianity often made him the opposite. That it did not always do so was because it was not always taken with sufficient seriousness by its adherents and was not always given complete control over their lives. In Macrobius's commentary on Cicero's *Dream of Scipio*, a pagan work of the early fifth century, there is an interesting illustration of the way in which religious contemplation, love of heaven, and superiority to the pleasures of earth, could yet be combined with a concern for the welfare of the present world and with a sense of obligation to labor for its

good.⁶ The contrast between this work and the common Christian attitude of the day is striking. Even after asceticism had developed into monasticism, not all Christians were monks; but monasticism was recognized as the one complete and consistent expression of the prevailing Christian ideal, and its leading representatives became the great heroes of the church. Nearly all the principal Fathers of the fourth and following centuries spent at least a part of their lives in the monastery, and many of them came back into the world to assume ecclesiastical positions of activity and responsibility only under protest and with the greatest reluctance.

It was the same general ideal of the Christian life that found expression in the celibacy of the clergy, which became common as early as the fourth century. If the clergy, charged as they were with active ecclesiastical duties in parish and diocese, could not live apart from the world, they could at any rate eschew the pleasures of the flesh, and by their chastity exemplify in a higher degree than the ordinary layman the Christian ideal shared by all. The sacredness of their calling demanded of them as consistent and thorough-going an expression of Christian principles as their duties permitted. Thus the bishop and the parish priest supplemented the inmate of the monastery in emphasizing and holding up before the world the Christian ideal of abstinence. Not to be a part of the world, but to be separate from it—this meant Christian holiness; and not to serve the world, but to rescue from its toils as many of one's fellows as possible—this meant Christian love.

For a long time the Christian church was a small institution, a mere handful of men and women in the midst of the teeming life of the vast Empire. And if it attracted notice at all, it was only to be hated by the populace and proscribed by the authorities. Under these circumstances it could perhaps hardly be expected that it would entertain any large ideals for the transformation of the life of the Empire and for the betterment of its social and economic conditions, and the utter lack of any hint of such ideals in the Christian literature of the second and third centu-

⁶ See an account of it in Dill's *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*, p. 108 ff.

ries need not cause surprise. But the striking fact is that the Fathers of the fourth and following centuries, after Christianity had become the official religion of the Empire and was in a position to dictate imperial legislation and to dominate the life of the Roman world, are as silent as their predecessors. In their writings, too, there is a complete absence of any suggestion of a comprehensive ideal of social or economic reform. There is plenty of denunciation of vice in high and low life, plenty of commendation of the Christian virtues, particularly of purity and charity, but of anything like a notion that the life of the Empire is to be transformed there is not a trace. The victory of the church found it entirely unprepared to take advantage of its new opportunity. If, before the opportunity came, it had been really interested in the transmutation of this world into the Kingdom of God, if it had placed this before itself as an ideal and had reflected seriously upon it, it would have seized with enthusiasm the great chance given it by Constantine and his successors, and the Empire would really have been changed into some semblance, at least, of a truly Christian state. But of transformation on any large and comprehensive scale none of the Fathers of the day seems to have thought. They had plenty of interest in the church, in the purity of its doctrines, in the strictness of its discipline in the splendor of its ritual, in the perfection of its administration, in its general efficiency as a divine institution existing for the purpose of rescuing men out of a perishing world. But to the world itself they gave little heed. The government's change of attitude toward the church, and the final recognition of Christianity as the state religion, they regarded as a blessing chiefly because it involved advantages to the church. It was of the church they thought rather than of the Empire. To secure for the church protection from its enemies and freedom to do its own work, to secure the backing of the government and the credit and the influence which such backing meant, this is what the Fathers of the fourth and following centuries chiefly wished. Augustine's great work, *The City of God*, is a classic illustration of the general attitude. Not one kingdom, the Kingdom of God, of which all the kingdoms of the world are to be made a part, and into whose likeness they are all to be transformed, but two kingdoms, a heavenly and an earthly,

the *Civitas Dei* and the *Civitas Terrena*, representing two opposing principles and permanently alien to each other. Not the regeneration of the latter, but its subjugation and ultimate destruction, is the final purpose of God.

In view of the somewhat negative conclusions of the present paper the question may be asked, How did it happen that Christianity spread so rapidly within the Roman world, and eventually crowded paganism out and became itself the state religion? In throwing doubt upon the social benefits which accrued to the Empire from Christianity do we not make the explanation of its victory correspondingly difficult? It is impossible in this paper to enter into a detailed discussion of this large question, but a few suggestions may not be out of place.

In the early days of the Roman Empire conditions were altogether favorable to the spread of any religious movement. It was a time of restlessness, of curiosity, and of avidity for things new and strange. It was a time when the world was alive to many needs of which it had not hitherto been conscious. The sense of sin, the recognition of the evil of the present world and the desire for release from it, the craving for redemption from the corruption and limitations of the flesh, the longing for immortality—all these, and others of a less spiritual and ethical character, were becoming very common under the growing influence of the dualism and pessimism of the Orient, the shifting of old landmarks, and the breaking down of time-honored traditions and customs. The new needs were demanding satisfaction, and the result was a great revival of religious faith and sentiment. Old cults became vigorous again, taking on new forms fitted to meet the new needs, and foreign cults which had hitherto had little or no vogue beyond their native land were now seized upon eagerly and gained a world-wide following. The ease of communication within the bounds of the Empire, the great Roman roads binding the provinces together, the excellent police protection making travel safer than ever before, the prevalence of a common language, and the increasing uniformity of culture, made the growth of any world-wide movement easy, and promoted the spread of many faiths. From Syria and Persia and Egypt they swept over the Empire, finding ready access and eager acceptance

everywhere. The remarkable spread of Mithraism during the first three centuries of the Empire is an illustration of the general situation, and an instructive parallel to—and commentary upon—the growth of Christianity. Its popularity in some regions was for generations equal to that of Christianity or even greater, and at one time it seemed about to become the state religion. Christianity was thus one of many faiths appealing to the Roman world, and shared with them the favoring influence of existing conditions. But it is no accident that it became ultimately dominant and crowded all the others off the field. The consciousness of unity among its adherents, however widely separated, and the magnificent organization in which that unity early found expression, making of the movement a compact and well-disciplined army of aggression, undoubtedly had much to do with its great success. The self-consciousness and exclusiveness of the church, and the assured conviction of Christians that they and they alone were the chosen people of God—a conviction inherited from Judaism—was immensely imposing and impressive in that age of religious syncretism and of the easy tolerance of all sorts of divergent faiths. Here was a movement that claimed everything and granted nothing. Bitter hostility was aroused of course, but also fanatical devotion.

But it would be a great mistake to imagine that this was the whole of it. As a matter of fact, ancient Christianity won its victory chiefly because it had far more of the elements of power and permanence, combined a greater variety of attractive features, and satisfied a greater variety of needs than any other system. However alive we may be to its defects, and however much we may deplore them, we must recognize that its victory in the Roman Empire was fairly earned by sheer superiority.

When we look at the matter more closely we find that Christianity appealed to the ancient world in many ways and along many lines. For instance it made a strong and varied religious appeal. Its revelation of one God and of the possibility of communion with him, its promise of redemption from sin and from the evils of the flesh and the world, its assurance of a blessed future in heaven, its spiritual fervor and its mystical rites, all had influence. It was interpreted by its supporters both legally

and mystically. It was given by some a predominantly Jewish, by others an Oriental, by others a Greek character, and so it addressed itself to a great diversity of temperaments.

Then, too, although the interest of the early Christians in social reform was very slight, as has been seen, Christianity did make an appeal to the social instincts of multitudes, especially of the lower classes. The emphasis upon the principle of Christian brotherhood, the idea which existed from the beginning that all Christians were members of one family, the closely knit federation, the intimate association within the local churches, the common care for those in sickness or distress or poverty—all this, matter of common knowledge as it was, must have proved immensely attractive.

Again, Christianity appeared before the world as a philosophy, claiming to offer a solution of the great problems of the ages and to meet as no other system did the intellectual needs of man. There was, for instance, its monotheism, at a time when the tendency of the thinking world was all away from the traditional polytheism of the past; its definite account, based upon alleged divine revelation, of the origin and consummation of the present world; its clear conception of man's place in the universe; its recognition of virtue as the doing of God's will; its doctrine of immortality and of future rewards and punishments; its idea of Christ as a divine being come down from heaven, which made possible the development of an elaborate cosmology and system of redemption; its sacred books, inherited from the Jews, which might be interpreted allegorically, as the great Jewish sage Philo had already interpreted them, and thus constituted a rich storehouse of knowledge and abundant food for speculation. And with all this, it claimed to be the fruit, not of human reflection, but of immediate divine revelation, and thus to be in possession, as no other system was, of the qualities of universality and finality. To philosophers of very diverse interests and tendencies Christianity made its appeal, and thus became a religion, not for the ignorant and uneducated only, but for the learned and cultured of the earth. Its greatest rivals for the conquest of the world were Mithraism, which addressed itself particularly to the instincts and desires of the common man and offered practically nothing

to the philosopher, and Neoplatonism, which appealed to the philosophical classes of the Empire, but not to the populace. Christianity made the double appeal, appearing on the one side as a religion with a practical message to every man, low or high, and on the other side as a philosophy, rivalling the great systems of antiquity, supplementing and correcting them, and at the same time assimilating many of their most persuasive features. No movement can spread rapidly and widely unless it appeals to the common man; and no movement can establish itself firmly and permanently unless it wins the thinking classes, the intellectual leaders of the world. Christianity did both, and it achieved a victory denied to rival faiths.

Still more important was the moral appeal of Christianity. At a time when the need of moral reformation was becoming ever more widely felt, and when both religion and philosophy were beginning to take on an ethical character, Christianity proclaimed with emphasis a strenuous ideal, urged motives of the most compelling character, and offered new and efficient moral power. It came just at a time when the world was most alive to its moral need and most ready to respond to a vigorous moral summons. It is here that we are to find Christianity's greatest and most beneficent influence upon the life of the Roman Empire. Though the Fathers seem to have been devoid of any idea of recreating the Empire in the likeness of Jesus Christ, and though we may be unable to discover that Christianity was actually instrumental in raising the general level of life within the Roman world, or that it promoted in any appreciable degree its change into the Kingdom of God, we are justified in assuming that the lives of multitudes, even of those who did not embrace monasticism, were affected by it, and that for good. It is not so much that Christianity taught an entirely new moral ideal, for many of the virtues that seemed important to the Christian Fathers were recognized by other moral teachers of their own and earlier days. The principle of the brotherhood of man, and the resultant virtues of charity and humanity, were inculcated by the Stoics; and the superiority to the pleasures and pains of the present world evinced by them and by the Cynics was equal to that urged by the Christian Fathers, while asceticism of an extreme type was zealously

preached and practised by the Neopythagoreans. The difference between the Christians and the more serious-minded of their contemporaries was in part simply a matter of emphasis, chastity for instance being given greater ethical importance than it commonly had in the paganism of the age; in part it was due to the special merit attached by the Christians to certain virtues of the gentler sort, which were not always regarded as virtues in the Roman world, such as humility, self-distrust, patience under suffering, forbearance, forgiveness of injuries, self-effacement rather than self-assertion. Here, too, we find anticipations in the pagan systems of the age; but in general the Christian ideal of the good man is different at this point from the pagan, and the tendency of it was to develop a different type of character. This tendency was noticed already by Celsus in the second century, and was the ground of a severe criticism of Christianity for inculcating and cultivating a "slave morality." The general development of Roman life, involving the rise of the lower classes and the gradual breaking down of the old social distinctions, was favorable to the prevalence of the new ideal; and just how much influence in effecting the change is to be attributed to Christianity it is impossible to say. To what degree, indeed, the change was accomplished within the Roman world nobody knows. There can be no doubt that there is a difference, at least in the respect just mentioned, between the Christian ideal, as commonly understood both in the middle and modern age, and the prevailing ideals of the pagan world of antiquity; yet it is difficult to say even now to what extent our modern life is actually controlled by the self-denying or by the self-asserting impulse, and to determine the matter for the later Roman Empire is quite out of the question. One thing, however, is clear enough. The interpretation of the Christian life as primarily and controllingly a life of social service, an interpretation so wide-spread today, was practically unknown among the Christians of the Roman world, and whatever the contrast between the pagan and the Christian ideals of that day may have been, it did not lie here.

But of greater practical importance than any difference of ideal were the new moral enthusiasm and the new moral impulses which Christianity brought to the Roman world. The preaching

of the Christian system as a direct divine revelation, the emphasis upon future rewards and punishments, the insistence upon virtue as a means of salvation, the interpretation of God in moral terms, the appeal to the example of Christ and the saints, the idea of the Christian life as involving moral duties and obligations, and the exhortation to Christians to be worthy of their calling, although not all new to the pagan world, in their combination meant much for the promotion of better living. And, above all, the recognition of the moral possibilities of the lowest, and the belief that every man may be if he will a child of God, had tremendous influence in arousing moral enthusiasm among those classes to which the great pagan moralists made little or no appeal. To the power of these and similar motives within the Christian church itself we have abundant testimony in the writings of the Fathers, both early and late. However difficult it may be to show any large effect of Christianity upon the life of the Empire as a whole, there were certainly multitudes of men and women whom it led to strive, as they would not otherwise have striven, after virtuous living. It is in its effect upon such individual lives, whether it drove them into the monastery or quickened their moral impulses for their daily conduct in the world outside, that we are to see the real influence of Christianity within the Roman world, as we are to see the real interest of the Christians themselves. Even if society in general may not have been much improved, and even if the forces making for the increase of the public weal may not have been largely multiplied, still the lives of many individuals were made better and holier.

It is undoubtedly a great pity that the social interest of Jesus did not live on in his followers. And yet we should not too lightly condemn them. They did a great work in the moral sphere. Even though from the modern point of view their ethical ideals seem defective, and in some respects unwholesome, they actually succeeded in impressing upon their own and all succeeding ages the need of moral reformation, and in supplying new moral enthusiasm and power, and that certainly meant much.

But perhaps more directly effective than all the specific appeals of ancient Christianity, religious, social, philosophical and moral, was the contagion of its personal loyalty to Jesus. Multitudes

who but imperfectly understood his ideals and were far from being controlled by his spirit were devoted to him and to what they believed to be his cause. And the conviction of his divinity but strengthened this devotion and gave a peculiarly exalted character to it. Even martyrdom seemed easy to many. It was no mere abstract principle for which they suffered, but a revered leader, who they believed was really with them, and whose face they looked upon in the rapture of ecstatic vision. As has been already said, the victory of Christianity was not an accident. There was abundant reason why it should attract the people of the Roman world and why it should lay hold upon the consciences and hearts of multitudes.

The Emperor Augustus and many of his successors realized that the Roman Empire needed a common religion to bind together its many and heterogeneous elements. The worship of the Genius of Rome and the Emperor was developed in its early days, and did actually constitute for a long time a religious bond, typifying the unity of the Roman world and nourishing loyalty to it. But at best it was an artificial thing, superimposed upon existing faiths; and it promoted rather official and formal than inner and vital unity. But Christianity was a different thing. Christians were actually bound together in the closest possible fashion. Loyalty to Christ and to the Christian church and to their Christian brethren was a passion with them. There was in the new movement a principle of unity which fitted it to do for the Roman Empire what no other religion of the age possibly could; and the action of Constantine and his successors was inevitable. Once become too strong to be crushed and strong enough to be used by the imperial power, its destiny as the Roman state religion was assured. But the alliance after all was but external. Christianity had been too long an individualistic religion to become in any real and vital sense the religion of a state; and the Empire never became anything more than nominally Christian. Present as it was at the birth of the new Western civilization and of the new Western nationalities, Christianity has dominated modern Europe as it never did the Roman Empire. It is in this modern world, and not in the ancient world, that its influence on any large scale is to be discovered. Here it has actually been a force from the

beginning. We live in an age in which the social conscience has been highly developed, and in which the gospel, in accordance with the spirit of Jesus himself, is interpreted largely in social terms. From this point of view the Christianity of Europe and America is still evidently very defective, and yet our civilization may be called a Christian civilization, not to be sure in any very thoroughgoing sense, but, even so, far more truly than the civilization of the Roman world.

*NEW TESTAMENT ESCHATOLOGY AND
NEW TESTAMENT ETHICS*

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The most important contribution of this generation to Biblical interpretation has been made, beyond question, through the appreciation and analysis of New Testament eschatology. Round the teaching of the Gospels, like an atmosphere which even though unconscious of it they breathe, lies, according to this view, a circle of apocalyptic expectation, with its literature, its vocabulary, and its inextinguishable hopes. Though Rabbinical orthodoxy might regard this literature as heretical, it may well have had a peculiar fascination for contemplative or poetic minds. When, therefore, after solitary reflection on his mission, Jesus came into Galilee 'preaching the gospel of the kingdom of God,' it might be anticipated that he, like John the Baptist, would apply to that kingdom the language of apocalyptic hope, and would announce its approach as heralded by a catastrophic end of the world-age. This key of interpretation, once in the hands of German learning, has been applied with extraordinary ingenuity to many obscurities and perplexities of the Gospels, and has unlocked some of them with dramatic success. The strange phenomenon, for example, of reserve and privacy in the teaching of Jesus, becomes, in this view, an evidence of his esoteric consciousness of Messiahship, which none but a chosen few were permitted to know. 'He that hath ears to hear, let him hear.' The cardinal phrases of the teaching. 'Kingdom of Heaven,' 'Son of God,' and 'Son of Man,' all point, it is urged, not to a normal, human or social regeneration, but to a supernatural, revolutionary, and catastrophic change. The heart of the gospel is thus disclosed in its mysterious predictive passages: In those days, after that tribulation, they shall see the Son of Man coming in the clouds with great power and glory; I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven; and the same note is

struck in the Epistles: Brethren, the time is short; the fashion of this world passeth away. "As a marine plant," remarks a vigorous exponent of this view, "blooms in water, but torn from its home becomes faded and unrecognizable, so the historical Jesus fades when torn from its place in eschatology."¹ Jesus, under this conception, is not so much teacher as prophet; with his gaze fixed, not on the conduct of life in the present world, but on the preparation of life for another world. "How could Jesus, the teacher," asks Schweitzer, in discussing the withdrawal to the North, "at such a moment desert a people so eager for teaching and help? [Such conduct] raises a doubt whether he felt himself to be in fact a teacher. . . . Even the announcement of his mission is not that of a teacher, for his parables were, it is written, designed not to reveal, but to conceal, and of the Kingdom of God he spoke only in parables."² "His ideal," an English advocate of the same view has lately said, "was not a human ideal, but a heavenly ideal. He did not wish to give men something to live by, but something wherewith to face the day of the Son of Man."³ In restrained, yet not unsympathetic, language, Professor Sanday calls attention to the significance of this tendency in criticism: "I doubt if we have realized how far the centre of gravity of our Lord's teaching lay beyond the grave. . . . I doubt if we have realized to what an extent he speaks of the Kingdom of Heaven as essentially future and essentially supernatural. . . . I doubt if we have appreciated the preliminary and preparatory character of his mission."⁴

Now it cannot be doubted that we have in this view an interpretative principle of the first importance. Its far-reaching effect upon critical study can be compared with nothing less than the epoch-making influence of Baur. Once in a century, it would seem, the pillars of New Testament history have to be tested, so that, as the Epistle to the Hebrews says, the removing of those things that are shaken may prove that those things which cannot

¹ A. Schweitzer, *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*, 1906, p. 399.

² Mark 4 10-12 34; *op. cit.*, p. 350.

³ H. M. Garrod, *The Religion of All Good Men*, 1906, p. 71.

⁴ *The Life of Christ in Recent Research*, 1907, p. 121.

be shaken shall remain. Yet, as it soon appeared that the *Tendenz* theory was destined to receive important qualifications, so that it must now be prized rather as a starting-point than as a conclusion in New Testament criticism, so it may be that eschatology must be submitted to many further tests before it can be trusted to support the whole structure of the gospel. That much of the New Testament language is colored by the apocalyptic anticipation, that the shadow of an imminent catastrophe passes, like a cloud across a landscape, over the Master's teaching, so that his mission receives what Professor Sanday has suggestively called an 'occultation'⁵—all this is not only so probable in the historical setting of the Gospels, but becomes so clarifying an element in their interpretation, that it is likely to remain a permanent factor in critical research. But to say this is to say much less than the consistent eschatologist affirms. To him this occultation was a lifelong eclipse; the Gospels become a kind of drama in which Jesus disguises until the last scene his predetermined purpose; and the narrative is, in effect, the story of a colossal illusion, which Christian theology, by every device of spiritualized interpretation, has endeavored to correct. "The Jesus of Nazareth," it is concluded, "who appeared as Messiah, taught the ethics of the kingdom, and died to consecrate his work, never lived. He is a figure sketched by rationalism, called to life by liberalism, and supplied by modern theology with the clothing of historical science." "The entire history of Christendom down to the present day rests on the delay and non-arrival of the Second Coming, on the surrender of eschatology, and the accompanying and self-developing deliverance of religion from the eschatological idea."⁶

Such an interpretation of history invites consideration from many points of view, and may be examined with advantage even by those who are not New Testament critics. One may, for example, approach the subject with the modest equipment of a teacher of ethics, and ask himself what was likely to be the ethical teaching which would naturally issue from this condition of exalted and confident expectation. It has been said that "it is necessary in interpreting the moral ideas of Christ to have our attention

⁵ Op. cit., p. 131.

⁶ Schweitzer, op. cit., pp. 396, 356.

always fixed on his apocalyptic ideas.”⁷ May not the converse of this proposition also be true, and may not the influence of the apocalyptic ideas be fairly estimated by reconsidering the ethics of the Gospels? Instead of applying the key of eschatology to New Testament ethics, may not New Testament ethics be applied as a key to its eschatology? What view of human conduct is likely to be held by one whose absorbing concern is for a supernatural and apocalyptic change, in which the fashion of this world would soon pass away? This inquiry is, at least, one which deals with the most unquestionable of the historical data. Whatever else may have been the purpose of Jesus, he was certainly a preacher of righteousness, and whatever else in his message may have been misinterpreted, his hearers were not likely to forget or to pervert his moral instruction. “The ethical note,” wrote no less radical a critic than Baur, “is the purest and most unmistakable element in the teaching of Jesus, and the essential core of Christianity.”⁸ “The ethical ideas of Jesus,” Professor Hermann has said, “are incontestably the essential element in the spiritual experience of the modern world.”⁹ May it not then be reasonable to estimate the force of the eschatological anticipation by its effect upon this ethical note? If the controlling interest of the teacher was habitually and consistently detached from present cares, what would his ethics be? Obviously they would express with consistency and continuity this abnormal, anticipatory, waiting habit of mind. The ethics of the Gospels would give us a teaching, not designed for this world, but preparatory for another; an ‘interim-ethics,’ appropriate for those who looked for some great catastrophe, but not to be taken seriously by those who have waked from the apocalyptic dream. The best way of conduct on the approach of an earthquake is not the best rule of conduct in a stable world. “Can any moralist,” it has been asked, “firmly persuaded of the imminent dissolution of the world and all things in it, frame an ethical code adequate for all time?”¹⁰ The answer to this question is in the unwavering dictum of Schweitzer:

⁷ Garrod, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

⁸ *Christentum der ersten drei Jahrhunderte*, 1860, p. 35.

⁹ *Die sittlichen Weisungen Jesu*, 1904, p. 12.

¹⁰ Garrod, *op. cit.*, pp. 60, 61.

"It is altogether false to affirm, with modern theology, that service is the new ethics of the kingdom. There is, to Jesus, no ethics of the kingdom; for in the kingdom all natural conditions, even differences of sex¹¹ are to disappear. Temptation and sin will no more exist. . . . Service, humility, temptation, willingness to die, even penitence, belong to an interim-ethics."¹²

When, however, we turn with this problem to the Gospels themselves, and set side by side with each other the eschatological dream and the ethical teaching, it seems not too much to say that at many points they do not match. The practical instructions of Jesus for the conduct of life do not easily fit in as a whole with the plot of the apocalyptic drama. Many passages there undoubtedly are which touch the anticipatory and millennial note, and some which strike that note firmly and unmistakably. If one fixes his attention on single passages, or on a single group of passages, he may easily conclude, with Tolstoi, that the essence of the Gospel is in the single virtue of non-resistance, or, with Schweitzer, that it is in the single idea of eschatology. When, however, we recall the prevailing tone of ethical teaching, and still more the habitual attitude of the Teacher toward the world in which he found himself, it is difficult to see in it a predominating quality of indifference to the world's affairs or of complete preoccupation with a supernatural catastrophe. On the contrary, the ethics of Jesus exhibit on the whole a sanity, universality, and applicability which are independent of abnormal circumstances, and free from emotional strain. There is nothing apocalyptic in the parable of the Good Samaritan, or in the appropriation by Jesus of the two great commandments, or in the prayer for to-day's bread and the forgiveness of trespasses, or in the praise of peace-making and purity of heart. Yet in these, and not in the mysterious prophecies of an approaching desolation, the conscience of the world has found its counsellor and guide. The apocalyptic anticipations find their parallels in much of the contemporary literature, but the ethical sagacity and sufficiency are original and unique. The same genuine concern for the existing world is indicated even in the teaching of Jesus concerning the Kingdom of God. Here, no doubt, his message is often colored by the sunset-splendor of the End

¹¹ Mark 10 25 26.

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 362.

of the Age; but it is not less often set in the prosaic light of common day. The kingdom is prepared, not for those only who have dismissed from concern the obligations of daily life and have fixed their eyes on a supernatural future, but for those who, in the world as it is, feed the hungry and clothe the naked and visit those who are sick or in prison. Whatever millennial promises may be comprehended in the message of the kingdom, the teaching of Jesus seems quite as often a warning against excessive contemplation of a supernatural consummation and a recall to the humble service of the existing world.

Still more corrective of a thoroughgoing eschatology is the habitual attitude of Jesus toward both nature and life. He looks on both, not with the eye of an ascetic or visionary, as though they stood between him and his supreme desire, but with a keen and undisguised appreciation and delight. Each phase of nature, springtime and harvest, the lilies and the birds, the mountain and the lake, each household task, the working of the leaven and the sweeping of the room—is to him beautiful and sacred; not as of a world that is passing away, but as of a world that is divinely given and spiritually symbolic. Human life also, its joys and sorrows, the children at their play, and the laborer at his work—these are not viewed with the pensive indifference of one whose heart is elsewhere, but with a keen sympathy and alert responsiveness which have suggested to many critics a Hellenic quality in Jesus, and have induced at least one writer to claim for him even a Hellenic descent.¹³

In short the ethical data of the Gospels appear to provide a test which is likely to modify or limit an extreme application of eschatology to their interpretation. If, as Bousset has remarked, the Gospels offer a religion of 'ethical liberation'¹⁴ it may be reasonable to conclude with him that "though steeped in the eschatological hopes of his time and country [Jesus] yet succeeded in altering and purifying them at the critical point, and in breaking through the limits which hemmed them in." The drama dimly discerned in the Gospels may thus be interpreted by the conduct

¹³H. S. Chamberlain, *Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*, I, 219 ff.

¹⁴Jesus (Trevelyan, 1906), pp. 162, 85.

habitually commended in the Gospels. Either we must conclude that while the mind of the Master was fixed on the future he scattered along his way, as a by-product of that teaching, his universal ethics, or else we must conclude that however real to his thought, as to that of his contemporaries, the Messianic expectation may have been, it did not dominate his teaching or his character, and that in his most characteristic instructions he rose above the anticipations of his time into the presence of timeless ideals. In short, this historical problem has to consider whether the secret of Jesus lay in his reflection of contemporary ideals or in his creation of new ideals; whether the apocalyptic expectation was his master or whether it was his servant; whether he reiterated the current eschatology or utilized and spiritualized it; whether in a word the central motive of his teaching was dramatic or didactic, the work of a herald or the work of a teacher; whether his place in history is to be found within the circle of contemporary thought, or whether he stood above the heads of his reporters. The conclusion which Wellhausen, not without impatience, but with eloquence and authority, announces, may provide a sufficient answer to these questions. "It is held," he remarks, "that the announcement of a future kingdom is the central element in the message. And yet, in Mark's Gospel, this element is completely in the background. Jesus, in his Galilean period, is not a herald but a teacher; and a teacher, it may be added, not of the Kingdom of God, but of the various subjects which, in natural succession, are thrown in his way,—of obvious truths applied to the needs of people misled by their spiritual guides. . . . The eschatological hope first reached its intense significance through the earliest disciples, who attached it to the person of Jesus. . . . His own way of life was not like that of his followers, determined by eschatology. They renounced the world to prepare for his coming; but his ethics were assuredly not, as uninformed persons have recklessly asserted, provisional ethics, to be endured only through the expectation of an approaching end, and beyond that point superfluous. His ethics were the eternal will of God, in heaven as on earth. He was, no doubt, deeply affected by faith in the future, in the general resurrection, the judgment, and the Kingdom of God. All this he could assume

as accepted by his hearers and needing little exhortation. . . . (Yet) it is the non-Jewish and human, rather than the Jewish in him, which stamps his character."¹⁵

Such are some brief suggestions of a corrective influence on New Testament eschatology which may proceed from New Testament ethics. The eschatological problem, it has been truthfully said, is just now 'in the air.'¹⁶ It may be the task of ethical inquiry to give to this airy structure of criticism a substantial underpinning on the ground. And this, it may be lastly pointed out, is not only an order of procedure which is applicable to New Testament criticism, but one which reflects an order of teaching which seems to have been the way of Jesus himself. Not, first, a conviction concerning his place in the plan of the Eternal and a full understanding of his mission; but, first, loyalty, obedience, moral susceptibility—such seems to have been his education to discipleship. "Follow me," he says, "Take up thy cross and follow"; and along the way of service you may reach the end of truth. Obedience, as Robertson taught, was to Jesus the organ of spiritual vision. Whatever dramatic elements there are included in the message of the Gospels may be best disclosed through its didactic elements. The first appeal of Jesus Christ was not to the reason or the imagination, but to the will. Character to him was the path to insight. The pure in heart should see God. Perhaps the guidance of New Testament criticism to a stable conclusion may be in the same manner committed to Christian ethics, and the metaphysics of the Gospels may be approached through the appreciation of their characteristic morality. Perhaps it may still happen that those who will to do the will are on the way to know the doctrine.

¹⁵ *Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien*, 1905, pp. 106, 113, 114.

¹⁶ Sanday, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

THE REALITY OF RELIGIOUS IDEALS

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Not the least significant fact of this great scientific age is its deep interest in religion. On the one hand, in spite of serious protests from the conservatives, science has established its right to apply the same method to the study of religion which has been of such great service in reducing the facts of other fields from chaos to order; and thus we have Comparative Religion, Higher Criticism, and the Psychology of Religion. On the other hand, attempts have been made from the philosophical side to furnish the same rationale for the ultimate religious concepts as for the scientific. The import of this has been, not to show that both sorts of ideas are ultimately equally invalid, equally lose themselves in the unknowable, as in the dark all cows are gray; but to show the legitimacy and importance of both in steering us in the direction of the real. What I am concerned with in this paper is to inquire into the validity of our religious ideals; but to do this I shall have to inquire first how any ideals become valid. If this seems a roundabout way, I still feel that it is the shortest way to reach the end in view.

The final problem which any theory of knowledge must attempt to solve is: How can ideas or concepts, which are merely structures of my mind, modifications of my brain and carried about in my head, mean or express the real nature of the world? To do justice to this problem here would be to furnish a complete system of epistemology and metaphysics. The limitation of our task makes this impossible; at most we can furnish only mere suggestions. We are concerned with the problem of knowledge in general only so far as this is involved in our more specific problem, namely, the real basis of our religious ideals. The first question, then, which we shall attempt to answer in barest outline is: How do concepts, structures in our mind, crystallize or *thicken*

into being, become objective fact? And the second, more special one, is: How does the criterion of the objectivity of concepts in general apply to the religious ideals?

One of the most suggestive things in modern philosophy is Herbert Spencer's definition of life, as "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations." "We perceive that what we call intelligence shows itself when the external relations to which the internal ones are adjusted begin to be numerous, complex, and remote in time or space; that every advance in intelligence essentially consists in the establishment of more varied, more complete, and more involved adjustments; and that even the highest achievements of science are resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so co-ordinated as exactly to tally with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that occur externally." And again: "Any assumption is justified by ascertaining that all the conclusions deducible from it correspond with the facts as directly observed; by showing the agreement between the experiences it leads us to anticipate and the actual experiences."¹ Or, as Professor James would express it: Our ideas are valid when they are "coterminous" with perception or fact. Our idea of an eclipse is true when our anticipation of it in space and time ends in the facts of the eclipse.

Life and knowledge are essentially adjustments to a larger world. The springs for such a process of adjustment must be found in human nature. Modern philosophy and psychology alike emphasize that we are essentially active or willing beings, beings with desires to be satisfied; and we are dependent upon the environment for the satisfaction of those desires. Our impulses or affections, as Butler pointed out long before Darwin and Spencer, are centrifugal; they point to objects beyond themselves for their realization; human nature as such is fragmentary, and points to a larger world for completion. Only in so far as the smaller system is adjusted to the larger system can our desires be realized. But how can the smaller system ever know anything about the larger and thus properly adjust itself?

The English empiricists from Locke down are right in emphasizing that our adjustments are the results of experience. Our

¹ First Principles, Chapter iv, The Relativity of Knowledge.

instinctive tendencies would remain at best vague and inchoate if it were not for individual experience, which serves to make them definite. It is by continuous attempts at adjustments, the fruitful adjustments surviving as exciting interest or gratifying desire while the vain ones perish, that the organism learns gradually what are the proper adjustments. It is only on the level of our ideational adjustments, however, that the question of the true and the false arises. The fruitfulness of these ideational adjustments is one evidence, at least, for their truthfulness. While not all fruitful ideas are true and not all true ideas are useful, in the long run such fruitful adjustments must be true to the character of reality. If deception and illusion worked as well in the long run as truth, science would be in vain; for falsehood is infinite, and there can be no science of falsehood. The usefulness of deception must always be for a limited purpose, due to the imperfect development or pathological condition of human nature. Just as, on the whole, pleasant things are wholesome, so, on the whole, useful ideas are true, though in either case there are temporary exceptions in the evolutionary process; in either case we must supplement experience with further experience.

What the early English empiricists neglected, in their eagerness to show that we learn by experience, was to answer the question, who am I?—to define the individual. They emphasized the part played by the environment at the expense of the individual, his tendencies and needs. The ego was to be a mere passive tablet, a piece of white paper, upon which Nature could write her sequences. This implied that the ego must be a mere nothing in fact, as Hume points out, a mere result of association, a "bundle of perceptions." But in that case there was neither any need nor any possibility of adjustment or knowledge. If the individual centres are nothing, we have a lot of nothings playing on nothings, and the environment has vanished with the individual. Thus Humean empiricism would reach its logical bankruptcy.

It was at this point that Kant took up the problem. Kant emphasized the dignity of the individual at the expense of the environment. The mass of sensations or data which are thrust upon us could present no order or meaning as such. The laws and system of the data are the work of the subject, which confronts the

environment with certain predispositions, certain ways of looking at things. It is a matter of wonder to the naïve Kant that the data conform so obediently to the order forced upon them! For *we* make the system of nature. What makes nature seem so objective is that we all agree in making it in the same way; it is a sort of social collusion. But the environment takes revenge for this violence upon it. If we insist upon making nature according to our models, she will refuse, at any rate, to tell us anything about herself, and thus leave us to the solitude of our own fancies. When Kant attempts to distinguish between empirical causal relations and causality in general as dictated by the subject, his system utterly breaks down. If particular causal relations must be ascertained through experience, what remains for the boasted category of causality to do? Thus Kant, in giving arbitrary priority to the individual subject, lost all real access to the environment.

In this dilemma the theory of knowledge remained substantially until the evolutionary movement. Both Hume and Kant emphasized important aspects of knowledge: we must learn from experience the real character of nature; and yet we can only get out of nature the meanings or laws with which we confront it. The abstract methods of Hume and Kant could not overcome this antinomy. Both neglected the problem of the genesis of knowledge, in the light of which its nature must be interpreted. The two positions can be reconciled only in a more concrete theory of the individual, which takes account of the nature of the individual as modified by history.

This history is as old as the universe in its changes of cosmic weather—for old as star-dust is mind-stuff, old as existence are ideals. True, we have no right to read the meaning of the later and more complex stages of history into the earlier and simpler ones and speak of inorganic nature in terms of will or reason, as animistic philosophers are fond of doing. It is to us, the spectators, that the simpler stages have meaning or purpose. Yet we believe that the simpler ones are continuous in one history with the more complex ones, that the whole process is obedient to one direction; and though we cannot reproduce even problematically the content or meaning of the simpler stages, we can

at any rate to some extent reproduce their external or phenomenal form. What we must emphasize is that we, as thus conditioned by race history, are subjects, conscious egos, possessing properties of our own, capable of certain habits or adjustments as regards the environment, and not the mere passive result of mechanical laws, a chance conjunction in the dance of atomic elements, whether sensational or material.

When the individual history of human organisms begins, a certain structural differentiation, as a result of the survival process of evolution, has already determined for us our general data of a world. Our sense-organs admit only of a certain kind of diversity; they are tools for picking out a certain range of data as "signs" of the energies of our environment. Not only our data, however, but our capacity for reacting, both in general and in more specific directions, has already been determined by the character of the nervous system. We start upon our brief human history with a certain temperament and endowment; but more than that, we possess an equipment of certain dispositions or tendencies, needs, or demands, which must be satisfied. In these we reap the results of past adjustments from a race history indefinitely old. And while these results are not experience, not innate ideas, they serve to economize experience. They furnish us with the warp for which individual experience must furnish the woof. They are general docilities which can be made definite by being consciously tried out.

These tendencies may be merely individual and material, such as the tendency to self-preservation, characteristic of all life, and, we might say with Spinoza, of physical things, too. Or the tendencies may lead to social satisfaction. They may be a craving for friendship, a taste for music, a feeling for consistency, a sense of right, or a yearning for the supernatural. The special adjustments or tools for the satisfaction of these tendencies have already to a large extent been provided for by the order of things into which we are born. By our tendency to imitate we become familiar with the adjustments of society, its knives and forks, its laws, its science, its religion. In the course of this imitation, which we call education, we discover our own meaning or purpose—ourselves. We contribute our own reaction or interpretation to the

past. But whether our adjustments are the result of inherited dispositions, or of imitation, or of purposive experiment, what determines the repetition or survival of an adjustment is its capacity for ministering to the needs of the individual and the race.

How far our adjustments or dispositions are *a priori*, in the sense of inherited, or are acquired within the history of the individual organism, we are not at present in a position to state, and perhaps never shall know; but one thing is certain, when we begin to be conscious of what we are doing, to reflect upon our own acts and processes, we do find ready-made a complex set of adjustments or dispositions; experience has already taken on certain forms or serial arrangements; we look for certain connections and continuities between phenomena. Hence the *a priori* categories of men like Kant and Schopenhauer. We awaken to that yearning for the wholeness of things which intoxicated Plato; we recognize certain demands for consistency and beauty, which both outstrip and set the programme for individual striving. That these adjustments or dispositions are the products of the interaction of the organism and the environment, physical and ideal, through the history of the race; that the environment has dictated to us what dispositions we must entertain to *survive*, long before our dispositions begin reflectively to dictate to nature what it shall *mean*—this is the contribution of the evolutionist movement. To supplement the empiricism of Locke and Hume, therefore, we must first recognize an instinctive structure with its tendencies, a subject capable of cumulative adjustment; and then substitute for the history of one individual experience the history of the race. In order to learn from experience, we must be equipped with mines of tendencies or interests which the energies out-side us can touch off. Nature can only become real to us as passing through human nature.

In all our adjustments, whether they are self-conscious or merely sentient, is involved trial, or experiment. Knowledge, too, starts with certain guesses, certain random efforts, spontaneous constructions—those surviving, on the whole, which issue in fruitful results. And the results become fruitful because the adjustments are made with reference to the character of reality. The organism must take account of the diversity, as well as identity,

of the environment; in other words, for the mental adjustment to become fact or to be successful, the *meant* identity or *meant* diversity must coincide with the *objective* identity or diversity of character. This aim at adjustment may be found in all stages, and may take account of a very abstract and immediate aspect of the environment or may aim at a very concrete and remote environment. Nor can we be neutral as regards reality beyond us, as we might be if we were merely bundles of perception or logic machines. We are bundles, not of perceptions, but of desires. The necessity to act in order to survive makes it impossible to be indifferent as regards our environment. And our actions imply certain beliefs with reference to the bigger world—the environment which we confront, whether we are conscious of those beliefs and whether they are those we profess or not.

How can we bring these beliefs or hypotheses to the test? How can we know whether they are the mere constructions of our brain, mere symbols, or whether they also express the character of reality? We have two ways of testing: one is a subjective way, referring to the proper functioning of our own thought; the other is objective, or refers to action. Ultimately, the two must coincide. The subjective criterion is that of consistency. Contradictory judgments cannot both be true. If I make the judgments that a house is red and that it is not red in the same respect, both judgments cannot express fact. But mere consistency does not make our ideas objective. Nor is social agreement sufficient to constitute objective fact. We can agree as to the meaning of centaurs and mermaids and a geometry of n dimensions. Yet this agreement does not constitute them objective facts. Ideas to become objective must not merely be consistent and capable of being agreed upon: they must lead to certain consequences of perception and action. If we can act *as if* a certain faith is real, if the environment responds to our action by ratifying our will, then our faith crystallizes into being and ceases to be mere faith or subjective attitude. We have hit upon the meaning, the real character, of our environment. Hence our environment responds by granting our request. Truth, finally, must be tested through the consequences in the way of conduct or procedure to which it leads—provided that we include in these both the difference which the object makes to our individual nature now and

the ratification of further experience. The latter can only come in as a proviso, necessary at any one time, owing to the finitude of human nature and the fluent character of reality. True, sometimes our response takes the form of intuitive certainty, the net result of race history; but this certainty must in the end be capable of being tested in the procedure of experience—even the golden rule and the venerable axioms of geometry.

In the degree, then, in which we can act *as if*, we have hit upon the true meaning of the environment; we can dictate to it because it has already dictated to us. Most of our guesses or faiths as regards reality are only partially responded to; we can only in part act *as if*. We can only act, perhaps, as though our faith were real for a certain abstract purpose. However, in so far as the environment responds even for the abstractest purpose, our idea or faith must embody an essential aspect of reality. Thus the atomic theory serves admirably for the grosser purposes of chemistry, while, in its classic form at least, it breaks down for certain phenomena of physics, such as electricity. Hence its truth must be regarded as partial. It does not express the whole truth of the character of the physical world; yet it does embody an essential, if abstract, aspect just in so far as we can act as if the world were made that way and get our results. If we take the ether, again, we find that for certain purposes it has been treated as a perfect fluid and for others as a perfect jelly. We have here apparent contradiction in the assumed substrate of phenomena, yet both beliefs with reference to it lead to fruitful consequences. Hence the abstract partial aspects must each have its right; and a concept must be possible that embodies both characters without contradiction. When we can form a concept, a mental construction, on which we can act consistently as if it expressed the essence or nature of reality, then this ceases to be mere belief or idea; it thickens into being, it *is* reality. Reality then conforms to our categories or ideas because these have been adjusted to it. It should be added that knowledge becomes exhaustive only when we deal with objects which are themselves meanings. Any number of people can have the reality of Hamlet.

It has been fashionable of late to speak of concepts as shorthand, merely convenient symbols, but without relation to the real world. In so far as they are mere subjective guesses, and reality

refuses to respond to them, to behave as if they were true, in so far we may speak of them as mere shorthand, mere symbols. But in so far as they become convenient, in so far as they form the basis of prediction, just so far do they cease to be mere shorthand. They must seize upon characters of reality in order to be serviceable, even though in the case of physical nature these characters are to-us-ward and do not reproduce or copy the inner reality of the process, and so do not completely thicken into being, but must be regarded as instrumental—good instruments if they work. So far as regards the real or inner nature of the environment, we must act by faith, not by sight. Our sensations as such are dependent for their character not merely upon the environment, but also upon our psychophysical organism, and at best they are but signs of what we intend. Nor can the real character of the environment be ascertained by mere thought, as Plato supposed, but by thought or creative imagination that realizes itself in action. Our ultimate clue to reality is that it behaves as if it conformed to our idea of it; when that happens, our constructive imagination must have succeeded in divining it or hitting it off, or succeeded so far as our finite limitations permit. How complex this environment shall be assumed to be, what diversity it shall possess for us, depends upon how we must regulate our conduct to obtain the satisfaction of our will. If we must act as if there were other individuals, other relatively independent centres of activity, then there *are* other individuals; and their *character* must be such as we must adjust ourselves to in order to have our expectations of them realized, in order to live properly. If we regard the physical world as mechanical, as mere means to an end, whereas we recognize human beings as ends in themselves, it is because only by distinguishing such objective values we attain the satisfaction, or good, of our will. Thus both the diversity of existence and the diversity of meaning, as regards the bigger world, are known through the differentiation of the activity of the subject, necessary in order to accomplish its end.

It is the plurality and changeability of our world that divorces truth as a mental structure from the characters of reality it *means*. Our meanings must readjust themselves to their changing objects or else prove false. On the other hand, truth could not *mean*

reality, could be nothing but mere shorthand, unless our mental structures were continuous with their environment. Here we seem to have an antinomy. Both discontinuity and continuity seem to be necessary in order to account for the nature of truth. Monism, by affirming the unity of the world as a static whole has failed to account for the relativity of truth as it attempts to express fact. Pluralism again, of the old-fashioned type, with its indifferent substances, made unity or continuity impossible, and hence made knowledge impossible. Both unity and plurality, continuity and discontinuity, must be true of the real, though under different conditions, because we must act as if they were true in order properly to adjust ourselves to the environment. Both, however, must be relative. The concrete truth must be somehow a universe of process with diversity of structure; with relatively stable centres that can interact and, in a measure, picture each other; of continuities and discontinuities according as the conditions are present or absent for connecting certain energies. If we must adjust ourselves to it as if it were such, then such it must be, even though we may not now be able to explain how it is so.

How does the above teleological criterion of being apply to the religious environment? We have seen how the mind has constructed for itself and projected a world of ideas in order to meet its environment, and said, "That art thou." In so far as its prediction has been verified and the proper adjustment thus obtained, the environment has replied, "That am I." The character we have given this environment has depended upon the needs of the soul to make itself at home in the world, to satisfy its wants. The environment again has reacted upon the adjustment and shown how far it has been adequate. Thus we have come to construct an inorganic, an organic, and a supra-organic, or psychic, environment, each of which grades of environment has proven its reality by the necessity of adjusting ourselves to it in order for the highest well-being. But in this historic process of adjustment even the psychic environment of social unity has proven inadequate without the faith in an ultimate spiritual environment which shall be the objectivity and fulfilment of our fragmentary human ideals. Thus the soul of man has built itself nobler

mansions, has constructed the ideal world of religion, even as the swallow builds herself a nest in order to feel cosier and more at home in an otherwise cold world. Now, does the religious ideal of a realized good in the world have any real basis, or is it but a fond dream? Is there any environment beyond and still higher than the supra-organic or social environment, already so difficult for us to grasp and yet so real? Man has at any rate acted upon the belief in such an unseen environment, higher than the human, and persists in doing so. Is there any justification for this?

The same criterion must be applied to the reality of the religious environment as has been applied to other kinds of environment. I can see no intrinsic difference as regards the test of religious concepts or hypotheses from the test of scientific. The former are more momentous hypotheses, to be sure, but that does not alter their verification. Science, too, is fundamentally built on faith, a faith built on very slender evidence—the faith that this Chinese puzzle of a world can be sorted and be made to fit together into a systematic whole; as religion is built upon the faith in a Power that is righteous, sympathizes with, and works for, righteousness. In any case the idea must be justified or proved by its consequences, or its ability to satisfy the needs of the individual, or at any rate the race in its progressive evolution. As we expect the scientific demand to grow more definite and articulate in the course of evolution, so we should expect the same in regard to the religious demands. If it is a great distance from Thales to modern science, so it is a long stretch from the Book of Judges to the Sermon on the Mount. In the case of science and religion alike, immediacy—whether the immediacy of perception as in science or the vaguer immediacy of instinctive feeling as in religion—must be interpreted and corrected in the light of further experience.

The question is: Is the religious environment bound up with the history of man in such a way that he must act *as if* it were real in order to attain his highest development? If the religious ideal is bound up with moral and social unity, as well as the highest individual appreciation and satisfaction; if there is no abatement of this adjustment, but, on the contrary, it increases in complexity and unity with the development of human life; if life would

be poorer without it; if, in short, the religious adjustment has proved a necessary one, in order to attain the highest and most effective life; and if materialism fails to inspire such a type of life, then the religious ideal must in some degree possess objective reality. Here, too, we have the survival of the fittest as regards beliefs; and the history of the race might be written as the history of religious beliefs. The working of the religious hypothesis must in-so-far be taken as evidence of its truthfulness, just as the working of the scientific hypothesis is in-so-far regarded as evidence of its truth. Both must be modified in the light of the requirements of further experience. The progressive usefulness in either case must prove the greater objectivity of the content. Can any one doubt the cementing influence of religious beliefs on social unities, or the heightening effect on morality of the faith in an impartial and sympathetic Spectator and Co-operator, or the association of religion with the highest in art? And as we learn to substitute more and more, in the progress of evolution, inner unity for mere mechanical coexistence, are we not progressing towards the appreciation of a higher spiritual unity, a supra-individual unity of souls greater than nations and greater than humanity; a unity which is not a mere block unity, like that of Parmenides, but a unity which embodies the end of ideal striving? If it is a fact that the religious ideal is thus essential to the highest unity and development of life, then the religious ideal can be no mere shadow projected by the imagination of man; but it becomes objective; it thickens into being. It is the ultimate constitution of the cosmos.

The mistake has been in the past of trying to express the environment of the individual and the race in merely physical or perceptual terms. This would provide no standard of fitness. It would merely record the fact of survival, and stamp that fit which does survive. We must, I think, regard the kingdom not-of-this-world as no less real than the kingdom of this world; the realm of formal demands and ideals no less real than the realm of facts and impulses. And not only must the former be as real as the latter, looked at from the point of view of existence, but the former must count for more, must legislate to the latter; the ideal environment must set the ultimate survival conditions of the natural. Else

the process can have no unity or meaning. Else no generalization would be possible. Natural science becomes as hopeless as ethics, for both involve the axiom that the cosmic process has direction, or is amenable to certain ideals.

What has been said with reference to the existence of the religious environment applies equally to its character. We cannot agree with Herbert Spencer that utter characterlessness, existence without content, is the goal of religious progress. What possible efficiency could mere empty existence have in human evolution? The same criterion which shows us *that* God is, shows us also *what* he is. The development of religion, moreover, shows more and more agreement as regards its content. All the developed religions agree in maintaining, though with different emphasis and concreteness, certain attributes as indispensable. Thus the ideal of goodness, as the supreme factor in the religious ideal, is common to all the great religions. It is evident that the more empty and vague the religious ideal is, the less effective it is; and that, on the other hand, the religious content which conduces to the most definite understanding of man's problems and contributes most to the development of man must be most objective.

We can only mention some of the most prominent characters of the religious ideal which have proved indispensable to its historic efficiency. One is the unity of the religious ideal as opposed to polytheism, the demand for one unique and final embodiment of the highest good. Furthermore, this unity must be a personal experience, not necessarily having our limitations, but capable of entering into sympathetic relations with all good strivings, as it has sufficient power to enforce its ideal. God must not be merely an impersonal constitution. Even the atheism of classical Buddhism could not be made practical until it apotheosized the founder.

Practical religion must, furthermore, identify itself with the values or norms of life primarily. In other words, the religious ideal must not be pantheistic. Only the finite can have worth. I do not see how any one can love or worship things in general, this medley of comedy and tragedy, of harmony and discord, which we call a world. Such a worship would seem possible only by killing the nerve of activity, by saying to the passing moment,

"Verweile doch, du bist so schön," which, if we believe *Faust*, is equivalent to selling one's self to the devil. However satisfying such a view may be aesthetically, it is not ethical. Pantheism is as unethical as materialism. A God that is identical with the totality of existence is helpless to redeem the world, as he is equally responsible for its sins and its virtues. Hence Christianity preaches a kingdom that is not of this world, a God of righteousness. "Be ye perfect as your Father in Heaven is perfect." God is identified with the absolute worth or goodness of the world, not with its mere brute existence. God is just, as identified with the realm of ideals, and as such he sets survival conditions to the lower finite centres; but the God required by human experience must also be merciful, and, as such, he strives to raise our finite lives to the standard. In this love of the perfect and striving to make the finite perfect, justice is not abrogated but fulfilled. The world consists of many centres of consciousness, who must learn to imitate, and make their own, the perfect good, each in his own way. And in this lies both the tragedy and the zest of life.

The truest and most objective religious ideal, then, is that which can furnish the completest and fullest satisfaction of the demands and longings of evolving humanity. The various religions, no matter how ancient and venerable, must submit to the pragmatic test, their ability to minister to human experience in all its complexity. Religions must not appeal merely to our credulity for the miraculous. In that case the savage religions would rank at the top; for, in the absence of science, there is no limit to the miraculous. Nor must the appeal be to a mere supernatural revelation or authority. In that case Brahmanism and the old Pharisaeism would rank foremost. Religions must appeal to the good sense of man; they must increase his perspective or sanity. They must enable him to think more deeply and truly; to appreciate and create greater beauty; to live more completely and fully, individually and socially. Christianity neither can nor must claim any exemption from this test of the completest ministry to human nature. With this it stands or falls, not with its ecclesiasticism or creeds. For the Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath.

Christianity is the highest religion to us because it, as no other,

furnishes, in the simplest and completest way, that environment of the soul which satisfies and makes objective its yearning for the highest good. And inasmuch as the personality of Jesus answers all our demands for personal goodness, as no other historic individual does—fulfils them not only relatively but completely—we must acknowledge him as divine in a unique way. He is to the Western world, at any rate, the concrete universal, the beautiful life—not only individually beautiful and complete, as a work of art, but the greatest energizing power for beauty, truth, and goodness. Nor is his claim to this position waning, but ever gaining new strength in the dissolution of dogmas and the crash of creeds. And in the struggle for survival which is now going on between the Western and Eastern world, in spite of, yea from, the smoke and din of battle and secular conquest, the ideal dominion of the Galilean promises to extend itself, in the centuries to come, to the ends of the earth.

THE USE OF HEBREW TO A MINISTER

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In its bearings on the preparation for the work of the ministry the question, *Is Hebrew worth while?* is a live one. Like most questions, it has more than one side. I may declare at the outset my own conviction. In the practical work of the ministry Hebrew is not only worth while, but in these times comes near being essential if the work is to be done in a thorough way. Hebrew should, therefore, not only be a part of every seminary curriculum, but should be required for graduation.

I have not room to discuss all the reasons that have been offered on the other side. I can only put together in the briefest way those that have struck me as especially forcible. I confess that they make a very strong case—far stronger than can be represented in my brief statement. I have seen and heard it said by very influential men that the demands made upon the minister today, especially if he be in charge of a city church, leave no time for delving into Hebrew; that this is not to be regretted, as he has little need to know about the long-gone days when Hebrew was a living language and produced a literature; that the learning of the language will draw upon time which, if invested elsewhere, will yield larger returns; that the minister needs to be trained with reference to present-day events, and that a Hebrew classroom is likely to send him forth more or less out of touch with the vital movements of the age which will speedily demand all his attention; that in giving so much time to such studies the seminary is training a man to be a Semitic specialist or professor rather than a minister.

I trust I can appreciate these arguments at their true value. But from most of them I entirely dissent. I know well enough from my own experience in the calling that in addition to a minister's regular work there are all sorts of unexpected and peculiar demands, day and night, from all sorts of people in all sorts of

trouble, from societies, secret orders, unions, camps of veterans, and so on and on. Many of these things are wholly foreign to his vocation; and if he speedily becomes known in the community as a man unwilling to talk and act about matters of which he knows nothing, he and his work will be the gainers in more than one direction. But even after he succeeds in getting and keeping his energies in their proper channel, he is a busy man. The work to be done on the narrowest professional basis, say some, leaves no time for Hebrew. On the contrary—and I am keeping here entirely within the limits of my experience—Hebrew, when systematically prosecuted, is one of the greatest time-savers known. In a surprisingly short time after the study is begun, it will yield a hundred-fold for all the labor spent upon it.

The minister must ordinarily provide for at least two sermons a week; must select and develop topics with reference to congregations which are practically unvarying in their constitution from Sunday to Sunday. And however we may deplore the lack of attention of some listeners, there are sure to be others who will remind us, if in our despair we ever dare fall back on an old sermon, that two years ago we preached on that text, and found the same points in it. A good working knowledge of Hebrew will do great things toward eliminating the problems of time, topic, and labor that seem to have fastened themselves so tenaciously to many ministerial careers. Select any Old Testament book you please, and study it with the best lexical, grammatical, and other apparatus to be had—of course keeping in mind as you proceed the work of the Sundays and the plain people with plain needs and no scholarship you must then meet—and your note book will accumulate sermons far faster than you can use them. Hebrew will be found to be the quickest and safest route to the sermon ever tried. I have known several ministers whose nerves almost collapsed under the constant strain of selecting texts and making sermons out of them. Why should there have been a strain? None of these men knew either Hebrew or Greek; and, with all their toils and sufferings, their best was mediocre or worse. Now I do not claim of course that the knowledge of Hebrew is going to make a preacher. But if the preacher be without this knowledge, he is placed at a grave disadvantage,

from which nothing short of the acquisition will relieve him. Nor can it truthfully be said that sermons dug from among Hebrew roots are dry, have a scholastic odor, and are remote from present conditions. Other things being equal, the man who has gone to the sources for his sermon is more likely to interest and benefit the average man than one who does not know the way to the sources. Then, too, sermons are supposed to deal in some way or other with the principles of morals and character as they are developed in the Bible. They cannot reliably and authoritatively be drawn forth from this book except through the close study of it in the form in which it has come to us.

If the minister carries into the pulpit the shavings and tools of the workshop instead of the finished product, that exhibition of pedantry, or the lack of common sense, as the case may be, points to a personal defect that lies much deeper than his knowledge of Hebrew. A seminary professor may fail to appreciate the point of view and needs of the minister, and may discipline his men as though their life's work were to be the discovery of the key to the Hittite language or research in Semitic philology. If so, the professor is certainly in the middle of a stage on which is being played a tragedy, and the authorities that retain him have set out the trappings. But to say that Hebrew ought therefore to be discarded from the course looks to me like shifting the blame from the abuser to the abused. There are some things in most seminary courses for which the minister has no particular use. Perhaps he finds that some things there taught really hamper him, and he must needs unlearn them. But no preacher who has once taken Hebrew along as one of his daily working tools, and found in his experience the surprising number of uses to which it can be put, will ever regard the study of it as of subordinate importance.

I suppose most men who preach sermons, in theory at least, consider that one of the purposes of the sermon is to impart instruction: it is more or less consciously addressed to the intelligence of the auditor. If there is no such purpose, the sermon will have made no demand on the speaker's mind, can make none on the hearer's, and will not be worth thirty minutes of the time of either. The text-book of this instruction is the Bible.

We rarely hear a sermon begin without the announcement of a text. We often hear sermons that immediately abandon the text; but that is the weakness of the preacher, and is another matter. The Bible is likely to maintain its present place in the teaching work of the church. But whether the use to which it there be put is teaching, worship, or something else, the situation, as regards the preacher's knowledge or ignorance of Hebrew, is not altered. Now the Bible was not written in English. The two great languages in which it has come to us abound in words which had an entirely different origin and development from those of the English equivalents which must be used to translate them. This is, of course, much more noticeable in Hebrew than in Greek. To cite only one instance: one of the common words in the Hebrew Old Testament is *Torah*. The English word generally employed in our versions to render it is 'law.' But 'law' has an entirely different origin and history from *torah*; the denotation of the two words coincides only in part while their connotations differ widely. In many instances 'law' does not convey to the English reader what *torah* conveys to the reader of the Hebrew, and in some places it is positively misleading.

It is true that he who uses words in speaking or writing with strict respect to their origin and growth is a pedant. Many men who speak correctly know nothing and care nothing for such things. We use words with reference to their present-day meaning; and a brief comparison of the Authorized and the Revised Versions of the English Bible will show that even in a literary language the significance of words shifts surprisingly in a comparatively short time. But still the origin and growth of words determine, more extensively than we may imagine, the thought, impression, feeling, which they awaken in the mind of one in whose presence they are uttered. Most words retain at least something of their primitive signification. If a word's main force at the present time is a later acquisition, still this is generally qualified, limited, restricted, toned, colored, by its origin in some fine way, of which we in using it may not be conscious. We select a word as the medium of our thought with reference to this qualified significance. When a synonym is proposed, we feel that it cannot play the part of a substitute. Sometimes in writing or speaking

we know that there is just one word to express the meaning we wish our sentence to convey. With that word it embodies our whole idea; without it our idea is dwarfed, enlarged, one-sided—in some manner deformed. We can think of words that almost do. They make good sense, perhaps better rhetoric; but somehow they do not fit. When we finally hit upon the right one, we can give no reason for preferring it: we merely feel that it is the word. These lights and shadows, shades and intensities of words, enter largely into the value of a language as an instrument of speech and into the power and beauty of its literature. Here we may look for much of the difference between two languages. This is one of the main reasons why translations are always inadequate.

In vocabulary Hebrew and English widely diverge, for the reason that the former had small influence in the formation of the latter. When the school-boy takes up Greek—and this is still more true of Latin—he immediately sees points of contact between that language and his own. In every line of his Caesar he meets words whose meanings are suggested by similar words that he daily uses. Latin, Greek, and English have in common many principles of grammar. But in Hebrew not only have we no derived words to assist us in gaining a vocabulary, but how far removed from anything we have heretofore known are the rules of its syntax! In the verb, for instance, there is no time element, no past, present, or future: in our verb, time is a controlling factor. In countless instances no translation can bring over the main force of a Hebrew verb without a circumlocution, which is impossible. These are not simply matters of nice distinctions. They frequently make the difference between the true and false interpretation of a passage. No man can discover the real idea in the mind of the writer of a Hebrew sentence unless he has access to the language. There is again that indefinable thing known as the genius or spirit of a literature, which cannot be adequately expressed in words or in any other material shape, because it is spiritual; which is not to be seen, or to be found by logic or philology, but which must be felt. I do not believe that any one can have a knowledge of the Old Testament sufficient to qualify him to be a teacher of it unless he has experienced this

spirit of its literature, which cannot be preserved in a rendering. To quote from Professor George Adam Smith: "Do not believe that the end of an accurate study of the Hebrew language is simply familiarity with a number of grammatical forms more or less obscure. Pains-taking students are otherwise rewarded. It is they who lay their hands on the prophet's heart and feel it beat; it is they who across the ages see the very features of his face as he calls; it is they into whom his style and his music pass."

No matter how excellent an Old Testament translation may be, the finest and best must be lost in the passage from one language to the other. One may be familiar with the story of Homer's epics, may have an intimate acquaintance with the best English renderings, may be exceptionally gifted as a teacher, but no one would admit the right of a man who does not know Greek to teach Homer. When the preacher announces a text from the Old Testament, he assumes the rôle of teacher of the passage he has chosen. True, we hear much said of the "devotional" treatment of the Bible, whatever that may mean. If it means a treatment with little or no reference to the mind of the man who wrote it, it is dishonest, and likely to lead the hearer to deal falsely with the Bible; if this treatment ignores the primary fact that man is a rational being, it is sure to be some sort of slovenly gush with nothing virile. No safe distinctions can be drawn between the scholastic and devotional study of the Bible. Indeed, it is deep down in the fundamentals of the language, hiding away in the roots of Hebrew words and in the crevices and corners of that language's grammar, that we will find some of the richest spiritual treasures, some of the most beautiful and most fragrant flowers. The appeal to the spiritual and intellectual in man is one. Fortunate indeed is the preacher who can walk with sure foot the field of Hebrew literature, a language as rugged as the land in which it lived; can look around its heavy boulders, and pluck from under their damp shade the violets, and hand them over to the old saint who waits upon his Sabbath morning message. That saint is no scholar, but he knows the fragrance and beauty of violets; and in the gratitude that lights the face the preacher is blessed in the doing.

The minister has no access to some of the finest helps on the Old Testament unless he has a working knowledge of Hebrew; to none of them has he more than a very partial access without this knowledge. The Lexicon of Brown, Driver, and Briggs has sermons in every column; it illumines the whole field and explains the details. If he does not know Hebrew it is as useless in a minister's library as a pile of brick. With this knowledge, it is of more practical worth than all the scholastic theology and devotional literature that could be packed in the rolling stock of a transcontinental railway. The International Critical Commentary is the greatest achievement in English in the interpretation of the Bible. It cannot be ignored when the meaning of a passage of Scripture is sought. No one is in a position to handle its volumes on the Old Testament if he has failed to master Hebrew. The power to use this great work and reap its magnificent harvest would alone repay the time and labor involved in providing one's self with the tool. Indeed, the value of any reliable work on any phase of the Old Testament, though it be written in a popular style, is increased enormously if the reader can accompany the author to the sources. Such works are entirely too numerous to cite here. But I may mention a recent contribution to biblical study which it may be safely supposed every minister who makes any pretension to keeping abreast of the age has at hand—Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible. It can be used, and most profitably, by any thoughtful person; but no one untrained in Hebrew can begin to measure its importance. I know one man who proposed to put the modern languages, especially German, in the place of the Hebrew in the regular seminary course. This looks to me like advising a man to spend all his substance for an ax-helve and leave himself without the means to procure an ax. German, particularly, is exceedingly valuable to the man who knows Hebrew. In that case he cannot better employ his time than in acquiring it. If he knows neither Hebrew nor German, he should acquire Hebrew first. The Germans certainly surpass all other peoples in the number of valuable works on the Bible. The two series of German commentaries on the Old Testament, the *Handkommentar zum Alten Testament*, and the *Kurzer Hand-Commentar zum Alten*

Testament, have not yet been equalled. Neither these nor numerous other German works could be accurately used without the knowledge of Hebrew. Now it is little short of ludicrous to expect men to stand before the people as teachers of the Bible, and to perform in the community the service of authorities on the Bible, when they have access neither to the original Bible itself nor to the best work that is being done on the Bible. I doubt if such a lack of professional equipment would be tolerated in any other calling.

Not in his Sunday labors only, but always and everywhere, the minister is considered an authority on all matters pertaining to the Bible. His estimate of himself may not be so extravagant. But his average fellow-citizen, if more considerate than to expect him to furnish at a moment's notice the details of any and every aspect of present-day biblical knowledge, does expect him to know where and how to get this information. This demand is not unjust. If a man is not willing to be, and to be regarded as, a specialist on the Bible, and to have men seek of him reliable opinions, he should resign from the ministry. The merchant owes it not only to his bank account and his own family, but especially to the community in which his business is a servant, to carry a complete stock. The minister needs to realize that one of the duties he owes to his church and to the place of his residence—and by no means his least important—is of the same kind. And in the light of his own ideal of this service he should regard it as immoral and dishonest to carry in stock shelf-worn commodities, left-overs from previous seasons, and dilapidated stuff bought on some one's bargain counters. The man who comes to him for information may find his wants supplied in this kind of stock; or the minister, being ignorant of the standards of value in his own business, may represent what he has as better than it is; or he may even condescend to deliberate deception rather than have his customer go to some one better qualified to serve. But satisfying an inquirer is not the only nor the chief end in view. Any sort of sophistry will generally do that. But the great thing for the minister to understand, when such an occasion arises, is that he has an opportunity, a privilege; that his questioner is interested enough in the Bible to go to the pains

of looking up some one to answer his questions; that he may possibly be able to stimulate these motives and lead the seeker out into the broad fields of biblical learning. If he can succeed in gathering around him a little group of young people or of ambitious Sunday-school teachers—or even one such person—for the purpose of studying the Bible in the original, he may justly regard that as a part of the finest fruit of his ministry.

A thorough, just, honest opinion on some of the most vital questions of the day cannot be formed except through the study of the Hebrew language. One of these is the higher criticism. The daily press and popular religious literature between them have given this subject a great deal of free advertising in recent years. In a certain way, mostly a very perverted way, it has filtered down among the people, and has produced in individual cases quite a variety of interesting psychological results. Some who wish to pose as smart, mostly young and inexperienced people, think they have received the full license for atheism, and that the thought of the age has proclaimed the Bible worthy of no man's serious attention. Some who have tried long and faithfully to live the righteous life, whose experience of the grace of God is far more profound than their knowledge of the conclusions of scholars, have had their faith rudely shaken and their peacefulness agitated by what they have heard of criticism from some third or fourth class source. Some intelligent man, a sincere inquirer after truth, who is not in the church, but who would make a valuable addition to the church, who has no desire to parade his independence or to appear as a freethinker, will drop into the minister's study some evening for expert opinion if he has reason to believe he will receive such. It is clearly a part of the pastoral vocation to handle these and all other classes of men who may be affected by biblical questions of the day in the way that will best promote their characters. He cannot, without a first-hand knowledge of the field such as we demand in his respective department of the physician, the lawyer, the chemist, the architect. Now you can start no Old Testament question that does not run right back, generally along perfectly straight lines, into the Hebrew text. All study above the original is superficial, unreliable, and second-hand, or worse.

Recently something like a breach has begun to appear between the ministry and biblical scholarship. This is perhaps most noticeable in the Old Testament field. Semitic research has met with rich rewards; the vastness of the unexplored ocean that rolls away is now appreciated, and Semitic specialists who have nothing to do with the ministry are associated with our universities. On the other hand the minister, in the midst of complex social conditions and an enormous mass of religious reading matter in his own tongue at hand, at the very beginning of his career finds the temptation strong to abandon the Hebrew he has brought out of the seminary as a useless weight on the journey. Too often he is in utter ignorance of what the Semitic specialist is doing, is too ignorant to appreciate his aims or to understand what he gives the world, even of the names of foremost scholars. Frequently on his library shelves is not to be found a single authoritative work on the Old Testament. Often his general feeling, so far as he has any, is that the scholar is an enemy of the faith, and is deliberately working to destroy all revealed religion. The time to close this breach is now. If it goes on to get wider, it is going to result in trouble for the ministry and the church. Semitic research will continue, whatever may happen to the ministry and the church. The only way to close the breach is for the minister to become a scholar, to get better acquainted with the book he teaches, and to keep up with the progress of biblical science. Investigators have already rendered to Christianity a service which is beyond all calculating; their service in the past would have been still greater if the ministry had been quicker to appreciate it; they have still greater gifts for the future. It becomes the ministry, then, to put itself in a receptive attitude, to get in intelligent sympathy with the work that must always remain fundamental to all progress in Bible study and to all the practical work of the church.

The varied work expected of the minister in this day is no valid excuse for neglecting Hebrew. A surgeon might with equal propriety plead demands upon his time as a reason for not becoming acquainted with certain standard professional instruments. It is his business to know them. In like manner it is the minister's business to know Hebrew. And in both cases

alike the business should appeal to the conscience with all the imperativeness and sacredness that duty can impart. Furthermore, I have pointed out how it is a time-saver. The ease with which Hebrew can be acquired now, in comparison with the difficulties of the study in former days, more than compensates for the fact that the study must now be carried on in a more complex professional life. Yet, in spite of his many duties, I suppose there is no minister today who is living such a laborious and nerve-racking life as John Knox. We are told that when more than forty years of age he discovered that the knowledge of Hebrew would be worth all the pains that acquisition involved, and he found the time to perform the task he thus set for himself. We may profit by his example.

The day has gone—or certainly is rapidly going—when the minister may expect anything from the mere wearing of the cloth. Priestcraft thrives on superstition and ignorance. These are passing. The minister must now establish his worth in the place where he resides as a man, a Christian, and a scholar. He will be respected and appreciated accordingly. Knowledge is all the time becoming more widely disseminated, education is becoming more general. It is needful, then, that the intellectual ideals of the minister, the teacher of the people, should be set above any mark we can find behind us. There is unquestionably a loud cry for ministers of general culture and special scholarship. The minister who recognizes this demand of the age and tries in his individual case to meet it will give his calling and the church a prestige which they both seem to stand in need of. We want, too, people of scholarly attainments and culture in the rank and file of the church's membership, deeply interested in the church's work and aims. Too often we find such persons out of touch with the church. In many instances they feel thus because they have heard its purposes set forth only by incompetent men she has had in her pulpits. These people, though they may never attend church, are not the enemies of Christianity. In fact, if a representative of the church who is their equal in ability, and with an adequate knowledge of what is being done in connection with the Bible, could explain matters to them, the scales would in many cases fall from their eyes, and both they and the church

would be gainers. One such person is worth a hundred people equally good in point of morality but without his intellectual advantages and gifts. It is simply the case of the man with five talents over against the man with one. It is as in the matter of giving. The man of small means who has only one dollar to give, and gives it in a cheerful spirit, certainly deserves as much praise as he who out of his abundance gives a million. But, nevertheless, the million will move mountains, while the work of the one may not be perceptible in the mass. The church must count largely on a ministry thoroughly trained in the book with which it deals to interest and hold that small but controlling class of society composed of the people with many mental talents.

In our country are towns large enough to sustain a half-dozen or more churches with not a minister capable of reading the Bible except in an English translation. It is not to be wondered at that the most intelligent classes in such communities feel that their needs are not supplied by the Sunday messages accessible to them. Neither is it a wonder that there is such a thing as the ministerial "dead-line." And I venture to believe that higher scholastic attainment, Christian character still being maintained as the first essential, would in large measure solve other professional problems.

ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON AS AN INTERPRETER
OF LIFE

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It is difficult to think of Robert Louis Stevenson as other than the creator of delightful and weird romances. His name always calls up *Treasure Island*—not to mention the other progeny of his fruitful imagination—*Treasure Island* and the higher geography. Stevenson will always stand forth as master of the finest artistry and as a modern symbol of the imagination. And it seems nothing short of sheer prose to turn from the fairy world flung into space by the deftness and swiftness of this man's fancy to our gray world of every day.

Yet Dr. Japp and Mr. Zangwill both insist that he will finally be remembered as an essayist and not as a romancer. We must all of us agree, I think, that whatever comes of Stevenson the fictionist, Stevenson the essayist has enriched the world by his half-dozen slim volumes of comment on life and men. If we think of the essay as a bit of preachment, we may still think of Stevenson as an essayist. He seems to like the rôle of preacher; and whatever our own homiletical notions may be, we must admit that his preaching is always fresh, human, and in good spirit; his truths stay with us and his disclosures send us afield for more truth,—qualities all preaching does not possess. "To be honest, to be kind, to earn a little and to spend a little less, to make upon the whole a family the happier for his presence, to renounce when that shall be necessary and not be embittered, to keep a few friends, but these without capitulation—above all, on the same grim condition, to keep friends with himself—here is a task for all that a man has of fortitude and delicacy." This is commonplace truth put with such finality and authority that, if it has not become scripture, it has at least served as a text for not a few preachers.

What could be more delightful than this from *An Inland Voyage*?

Stevenson and his companion are off in their canoes. The lads and lasses of Origny run along the banks of the Oise, cheering. The last of those to send their adieus after the gay voyagers are the three graces, and just as the canoes flash round a bend in the stream, one of the girls leaps upon a tree-stump and kisses her hand to the canoeists, crying gleefully, "Come back again, come back again." To which challenge, our preacher cannot refrain from replying from beneath his gypsy mask:—

Come back again? There is no coming back, young ladies, on the impetuous stream of life.

‘The merchant bows unto the seaman’s star,
The ploughman from the sun his season takes.’

And we must all set our pocket watches by the clock of fate. There is a headlong, forthright tide, that bears away man with his fancies like straw, and runs fast in time and space. It is full of curves like this, your winding river of Oise; and lingers and returns in pleasant pastorals; and yet, rightly thought upon, never returns at all. For though it should revisit the same acre of meadow in the same hour, it will have made an ample sweep between whiles; many little streams will have fallen in; many exhalations risen towards the sun; and even although it were the same acre, it will not be the same river Oise. And thus, O graces of Origny, although the wandering fortune of my life should carry me back again to where you await death’s whistle by the river, that will not be the old I who walks the street; and those wives and mothers, say will those be you?

Some one may think that this comes very near being, what any preaching may easily become, platitudinous; yet it is saved by the freshness of the treatment, by the blithe spirit of the preacher, and by the swish of the paddles that he manages to get into his out-of-doors discourse.

It is said that Coleridge once asked Charles Lamb if he had ever heard him preach. Lamb replied, "I never heard you do anything else." We may say the same for Stevenson. Let no one protest that he was rather an artist. I do not mean that he was a boor. I know that he never wears the prophet’s rage like Carlyle, and is never confessedly a teacher of men like Ruskin. He is also

unconventional, both as to subject and treatment. He affects "a light conscience." He assumes a care-free manner. He speaks very much as if he were a scarcely interested spectator of the splendid pageant of life. Still he cannot deceive us. It is easy to see where his heart is. The universe haunts him. He travels far and is always interested in new lands, yet deeper than that interest is his interest in life. He is always trying to get "back of beyond." He rides with a careless grace in his canoe, or astride Modestine, or in the steerage; yet he is always looking out of the tail of his eye at life. He will take the universe unawares and surprise it out of its secret. As he goes to and fro in the world "full of a number of things," he is ever singing the "beauty and terror of the world." I have always thought that that picture of him that shows him a gaunt invalid, propped up in pillows, the haunting face circled with unkempt hair, the eyes looking far away

To where the roads on either hand
Lead onward into fairy land.

gives us the soul of the man. He is ever doing one thing, in essay or romance—spelling out the meaning of life.

This is not to be wondered at, whether we think of the man's inheritance and experience, or whether we remind ourselves that we are all doing the same thing most of our time. An ancient worthy assures us that God hath given to the sons of men this sore travail to be exercised therewith. And long before his day men were searching out by wisdom all things done under the sun. At the present moment an especial interest is manifest in the interpretation of life, as can be seen from our periodical literature and the lecture platform. The pity is, not that this is so, but that so much of the discourse on life rests upon meagre data, small observation, and limited experience, and proceeds in a petulant mood to a disheartening conclusion. For the most part our latter-day prophets make us to feel the "devouringelement in the universe" rather than the universe; while those truths revealed to babes and savages and "hid from political economists" are never set before us. The current reading of life is altogether partial, because so ill-informed. We need to get this point if we are to realize Stevenson's value to

his generation, and we may believe to all generations, as an interpreter of life.

In our childhood we have no suspicion of the universe. We never imagine that we could have made a better one. We are in "eternal brotherhood with it." Life then, whatever its outward seeming, always "has a golden chamber at the heart of it." Then we hear "the nightingale singing" and the "music of the runnel." Life is an opportunity for admiration and joy. Even to the end, for not a few men, life is fraught with hope. Until the autumn time, many a man commits himself to the sunshine on the hills, the laughter of children, gracious women, true men, bird-songs and apple-blossoms; believes in these things as much as he does in "old iron, cheap desires, and cheap fears," and thinks of them more. Some, indeed, like Paul the apostle, grow in capacity for faith, hope, and love, with the years, as every normal person should; but a pathetically large number lose their sight as they grow older. For many of us the bloom of the world gets rubbed off as we go forward across the continent of the years. Then it is that we grow conscious of the catastrophe and forget the myrtle vine. We see nature red in tooth and claw. We accept that miserable fable from the Orient that tells us that life is but the clinging to a wild vine upon which the mice remorselessly gnaw, while the dragon waits patiently below and the beast watches relentlessly above. Our only possibility is a lick at the honey accidentally caught on the wild bush at our side. A delirium-tremens view of life, one would say; yet a number of folk who would resent any insinuation of nervous disorder on their part hold this view of the universe and life. Indeed, they seem to get a kind of satisfaction in thinking of the mud and old iron, the poison-berries and pestilences, the ironies and hardships, that enter into the mixture of life. To every man with a reasonably good digestion and a normal perspective of life these fellows must seem to be the blue-devils philosophers, and by good rights ought to join the Suicide Club.

Stevenson had no sympathy with such representations of life. He does not belong in the company of such interpreters. From the first he believed in himself, his fellows, life, and God. He says somewhere, "There is manifestly a God if we want to find

him." Spite of the rampant materialism in the thought of his time, life was always to him more than "a Permanent Possibility of Sensation," and not even the capitalization of the theorem could make up for its other deficiencies. He believed in the "livableness of life." He saw that pessimism is not convincing. Some few men may believe in it. Many other men may believe that they believe in it; but when they draw their chairs in to dinner, it is evident that their philosophy of life sits lightly upon them. The multitude of men and women, Stevenson saw, live their lives with a relish, enjoy their dinners, make their jests with an unmistakable satisfaction, and sleep through the night. This fact weighed with Stevenson, as did the simple faith of the children. So he proclaims the world excellent, revels in the companionship of children, remembers the faces of women without desire, is pleased with the deeds of men without envy, and has an affection for his paddle. In his early manhood he had a dislike for what he calls the "Bastile of civilization." He had no lust for the glory and the wealth that come to him who "can sit squarest on a three-legged stool." He could not see that man's wash-bowl has a right to be considered a worthy competitor of God's river, if the imagination is to be cleansed. Yet as he grew older he came to love even civilization, to see registered in it an age-long and gigantic striving on the part of man, not wholly useless. So in the closing years our gypsily-inclined philosopher, carrying with him the fragrance of the out-of-doors, becomes something of a patriarch, with a numerous household about him and a personal interest in all the affairs of his island empire.

In other words, Stevenson is the prophet of good cheer. The world as he sees it is a heartening place. Suspicion of the nature of things is contemptible. To lack faith is to think that God is not a gentleman. Pessimism becomes an infinite insolence, a suspicion that does not speak well for the character of its holder.

Those of us who have been compelled to listen to the current mouthings of a cheap cynicism, much in vogue, who have been pelted and pestered with the ooze and slime of things in general, have no difficulty in understanding the welcome that was given

at once to Stevenson's protest. His life and his word came as a clean, heartening breath of air. This is generally recognized. No one questions but that he has added immensely to the good cheer of human-kind. We do well, however, to keep one other fact before our minds when we think of this service: his protest was not merely instinctive.

There are evidently not a few critics who tacitly assume that his view of life was largely temperamental. Well, it was temperamental. His life enters into his message, and was back of all his preaching. I think we should not try to question this point. His temperament must be taken into account, and also his training, and his inheritance, and his opportunity for seeing life, and his experience as a sufferer. His temperament was anything but morbid. All of his intimate friends remark the gaiety of the man. His coming into the room was always like the lighting of another candle. He was no juniper-bush fellow. On the contrary, he was a blithe pilgrim, and at the start struck a good stride as he took the road for the City. He loved the road and the morning and the valley. He knew Seigneur, and had found "him the best of acquaintances." He was a Scotchman. Yes, yet not a Shorter Catechist, nor a gypsy, nor a Bohemian; but a genial, brotherly traveller, who somewhere, sometime, must have been converted to the "religion of healthy-mindedness." And though for twelve long years the road ran for him along the Valley of the Shadow, he was all that way "a fellow with something pushing and spontaneous in his inside," and strode right on with unflagging courage, leaving behind him "a hopeful impulse that has immensely bettered the tradition of mankind."

Still, the man's temperament does not account for his view of life. That was reached by a rational process. It came as the result of his large knowledge of the facts of life, of his powers of divination, and of the penetration of his vision.

The interpreters to whom reference has been made lack both in powers of vision and generalization. They see life in spots. They abstract a section of the universe and look at it under their glasses. They literally yank facts out of their settings to study them. They have a capacity for single notes or for the simple themes of life, but not for the great symphony. Their conclusions

are worthless because so partial. Life, whole and living—this is beyond them. They have not the poet's vision, nor the poet's method, nor the poet's artistry. The forward movement of life, the universal lift, registered in the history of man and the cosmos, they have never divined. One gets up from the average book that treats of life, that essays to interpret life to us, and goes forth into the real world, bearing as it does upon its whole face the image of God, and is conscious of one great fact: our book-man has lost the bloom of the world in his reproduction of it—the bloom and the perspective and the liveness. Much of our philosophizing on life is as true as the average amateurish landscape sketch, and no truer. Its hard lines, crude drawing, and wooden surface may suggest to its author the loveliness of the earth, but it is no symbol of that subtle beauty to the general public.

Herein is the genius of Stevenson. He has both vision and the poet's synthetic power. He sees life whole. His picture sets reality before us with the charm and beauty of reality still upon it, satisfying the eyes and the imagination alike. And we may be sure that this kind comes only by patient brooding and quiet thinking, and then only to those to whom the Muses have been unusually generous.

I insist upon this point, as it makes his message all the more significant. And we have his own word for our insistence. We know that he was reared of Scotch parents, under the Scotch creed. We know that he very early began to make notes upon life for himself. We know that he early turned away from his father's Calvinism. The reaction was not violent; still it was important. We are told that various influences soon cured his soul and brought him the vision of God and the Moral Order. These facts help us to understand much of what he has said, and enable us to better appreciate his intellectual temper. Of this experience, or of these experiences, he says: "I came about like a well-handled ship. There stood at the wheel that unknown steersman, whom we call God." His word for it, then, his view of life was an achievement. In the light of his ancestral inheritance, his parental training, his course of life, his temperament, and his suffering, this is all the more important. It will not do for us to wave his word aside as

but the welling up of a happy, care-free heart. He speaks only after a large experience and when his imagination has made the whole circle of truth.

This may seem like making too serious a claim. I know his books are not heavy, lengthy treatises. He deals in no scientific or philosophic jargon. Yet we should not be misled by the gaiety of his manner nor by the lightness of his touch. He is following most closely Nature's method: a delicate line, a filmy hint, an elusive signal. Nature, whenever we go to her, refuses to give us truth in broadsides. She never puts her word into the form of a systematic theology. Still, her suggestions are worthy of our attention. They mark the path to all the truth we shall ever know. Stevenson discloses the greatness of his art in the delicacy of his portraiture. We are stupid indeed if we think that such work indicates a lack of largeness and sincerity and earnestness in the intellectual processes of the man. So when Stevenson insists that life is good and livable and that he knows Seigneur, we are to take him seriously.

Here is an example of what is meant. He had slept the night in God's great hostelry. Setting out anew on his journey, he registers his gratitude: "The room was airy, the water excellent, and the dawn had called me to a moment. I say nothing of the tapestries or the inimitable ceiling, nor yet of the view which I commanded from the windows; but I felt that I was in some one's debt for all this liberal entertainment. And so it pleased me, in a half-laughing way, to leave pieces of money on the turf as I went along, until I had left enough for my night's lodging. I trust they did not fall to some rich and churlish drover." We mistake if we think of this as a mere youthful, whimsical doing, or as a dramatic turn. It is the outgoing of a reverent, grateful, and gentle spirit.

One cannot but think of "Sweet Saint Francis" and his preaching to the birds that gather "from moor and mere and darkest wood" around Assisi's convent gate—a practice on the part of the mystic saint that admits of most severe criticism if we are only prosaic enough; but the poet Longfellow points the deeper meaning. The feathered throng departs—

Deep peace was in Saint Francis' heart.
He knew not if the brotherhood
His homily understood;
He only knew that to one Ear
The meaning of his words was clear.

Stevenson's "settling" for his liberal entertainment is of a piece with the preaching to the birds.

It is said that Stevenson was once in a boat which was bearing several Sisters of Charity to a lepers' island. As the boat neared the shore and the women caught sight of their future of suffering and isolation, they were very much moved and sat quietly weeping. What finer or more tender or truer word could have been spoken to them under the circumstances than that spoken by Stevenson? "Ladies, God himself is here to give you welcome." Only one who really knows Seigneur can ever speak like that, and we must let such words mean all they can.

So of the Vailima prayers. They have become justly famed. Yet it is a mistake to think of them as simply artistic products, though that they are. They ought to speak to us of a profound and beautiful faith in God, however gaily they seem to trip forth.

If any one still believes that Stevenson's interpretation of life is largely temperamental rather than rational, let him read this: "If I from my spy-hole, looking with purblind eyes upon the least part of a fraction of the universe, yet perceive in my own destiny some broken evidences of a plan, and some signals of an overruling goodness, shall I then be so mad as to complain that all cannot be explained? Shall I not rather wonder with infinite and grateful surprise, that in so vast a scheme I seem to have been able to read, however little, and that little encouraging to faith?" Here in his own words he tells us that his life-view is an achievement.

We all set forth with an instinctive faith in the world. The problem of life, as it presents itself to the intellect, seems to be to adjust this faith to our enlarging and often disconcerting experience. Not a few are utterly unable to do this, and journey most of the way with the "mists of darkness" upon their eyes. A larger number cling to their childhood faith, whether or not they

can rationalize it. Stevenson was gifted above his fellows, was poet and mystic; yet he, too, had to wait. But he was one who could wait. He had it in him to cling to his paddle. And he clung instinctively to his faith until the mists burned off and the whole valley of the earth lay before him in the glory of the sunlight. His victory was facilitated by temperament and a long experience of suffering, yet possible, after all, because of an unusual gift of vision and imagination.

And this Robert Louis Stevenson, who sets forth life whole and with the glory of God upon it, so that a love for it arises in our hearts, belongs of good right, not simply because of his romances, but because of his preaching, among the immortals.

NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIAS¹

Whatever title to intellectual distinction the future historian may deny to our time, its right to be called the age of encyclopaedias will hardly be challenged. We have general encyclopaedias on a scale almost Chinese and special encyclopaedias of every branch of learning, science, and art. No generation has put so much of its time—profitably or unprofitably—into co-operative enterprises for alphabetizing all knowledge. We have had within the last few years two large Bible dictionaries—one of them with two supplements; a Jewish Encyclopedia in twelve volumes; new editions of the standard Protestant encyclopaedia of Herzog-Plitt-Hauck and of the Catholic encyclopaedia of Wetzer and Welte-Hergenröther-Kaulen; the beginning of a great Catholic Encyclopedia in English and of an encyclopaedia of Islam; and now the first instalment of an Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, which will extend to at least ten volumes. The scope of the work is thus set forth in the Preface:

“The words ‘Religion’ and ‘Ethics’ are both used in their most comprehensive meaning, as the contents of this volume will show. The Encyclopedia will contain articles on all the Religions of the world and on all the great systems of Ethics. It will aim, further, at containing articles on every religious belief or custom, and on every ethical movement, every philosophical idea, every moral practice. Such persons and places as are famous in the history of religion and morals will be included. The Encyclopedia will thus embrace the whole range of Theology and Philosophy, together with the relevant portions of Anthropology,

¹ Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics. Edited by James Hastings. Volume I, A—Art. Lex. 8vo, pp. 22 + 903. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1908. Price, cloth, \$7.00 net, half-morocco, \$9.00.

The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge. Based on the third edition of the *Realencyklopädie* founded by J. J. Herzog, and edited by Albert Hauck. Prepared . . . under the supervision of Samuel Macauley Jackson, Editor-in-Chief, etc. Volume I, Aachen-Basilians. Lex. 8vo, pp. 30 + 500. New York and London: Funk & Wagnalls Company. 1908. Price, —.

Mythology, Folk-lore, Biology, Psychology, Economics, and Sociology."

There are few things in heaven or earth which are not somewhere and somehow connected with religions or morals, and the editor has been generous in his inclusions. For example, the article on 'Anaesthesia' is a brief history of the use of anaesthetics in surgery, and barely alludes to the opposition to anaesthesia on religious grounds which would seem to be the only reason why the subject should have a place in an encyclopaedia of religion. Several of the biological, economic, and legal articles are, in the manner in which they are treated, somewhat remotely associated with either religion or ethics ('Abiogenesis,' 'Abnormalities,' 'Accumulation,' 'Accidents'); under 'Accommodation' the biological and psychological uses of the word are discussed, but the specific senses in which it has been used in theology and in the history of Christian missions are not touched.

The scale of the whole work is sufficiently ample to allow an author who knows how to deny himself and can write at once concisely and clearly to treat even large subjects adequately. The preservation of reasonable proportion between the several articles demands of the general editor sound judgment and uncommon firmness. It would be too much to say that this superhuman excellence is fully obtained in the present volume. The length of the articles in some cases seems to correspond to the contributor's interest in the subject rather than to their relative importance from the reader's point of view, as in the article on the 'Amana Society,' which fills as much space as 'Alexandrian Theology,' and more than the 'Apostolic Age'; but on the whole this part of the task has been satisfactorily fulfilled.

The editor has achieved a conspicuous success in enlisting contributors; the roll of authors prefixed to the volume contains many eminent names and few quite unknown to fame. An unusual proportion of articles are written by scholars who will be recognized at once as the fittest of living men to treat the subject, and many more by men of unquestioned competence in their respective fields. Thus, Aston writes on various topics connected with the native religion of Japan; Batchelor on the Ainus; Cumont on Mithraic architecture and art; Ehrenreich on South

America; Littmann on Abyssinia; Nöldeke on the religion of the ancient Arabs; Strack on Anti-Semitism, and so on. This feature of the work may be illustrated in another way by taking the names of the writers who contribute the articles connected with India. The list includes Crooke, Rhys Davids and Mrs. Rhys Davids, Fick, Grierson, Hoernle, Jacobi, Jolly, Sylvain Lévi, and de la Vallée Poussin. Among the contributors are numbered not only Europeans and Americans but Oriental scholars of various nationalities—Hindu, Parsee, Japanese.

Among the articles of especial note may be named those on 'Aegean Religion,' by Hogarth—the first comprehensive presentation of the results of archaeological discoveries of recent years; 'Andeans,' by Sir Clements Markham; 'Arabs' (Ancient), by Nöldeke; 'Ajivikas,' by Hoernle; 'Adibuddha,' by de la Vallée Poussin; and the exhaustive article on 'Animals' and animal-worship (fifty-two pages, with full bibliography), by N. W. Thomas.

Customs and beliefs common to many peoples and religions are treated in a series of articles by specialists in the respective fields, to which is prefixed a general introduction surveying the whole ground. Thus, under 'Ancestor-Worship and Cult of the Dead,' William Crooke describes the phenomena as a whole, and discusses the various theories of the relation of the religion of the gods to ancestor-worship; this is followed by articles on ancestor-worship among the peoples of America (S. Hagar); Babylonian ancestor-worship (G. Margoliouth); Celtic (L. H. Gray); Egyptian (H. R. Hall); Fijian (B. Thomson); Hebrew (Margoliouth); Indian (Crooke); Iranian (E. Lehmann); Japanese (M. Revon); Jewish (Margoliouth); Polynesian (Gray); Roman (J. B. Carter); Slavonic (L. Leger); Tasmanian (Gray); Teutonic (H. M. Chadwick); Ugro-Finnic (K. Krohn); while for the African peoples, Aryans, Australians, Chinese, Greeks, and Sabaeans the subject is postponed to articles in future volumes. The whole fills forty-two closely printed pages. The list, though extensive, is not complete: the Mongols, for instance, seem to have no place, unless incidentally in the future article on China.

Other examples of great co-operative articles are 'Architecture' (ninety-eight pages, illustrated in the text) and 'Art' (seventy-one

pages, with fifteen additional pages of half-tone plates). In both these articles many of the authors take their commission very broadly, and do not at all confine themselves to religious architecture or art.

Omissions are inevitable in a work of such wide scope: under 'Alchemy,' e.g., the subdivisions are, Greek and Roman, Muhammadan, and European; Chinese alchemy is not mentioned. It may be presumed that some account of it will be given under 'Taoism'; but the subject is certainly important enough to deserve separate treatment, if only to facilitate comparison with western forms of the pseudo-science. A cursory inspection discovers neither entry nor reference for Abydos (though places of much less religious importance are included), Abraxas ('Amulet' is to be brought in under 'Charm'), or for gods and mythological figures such as Adapa, Aglibol, Alilat (Allat), Anu, Anat—names which a reader would naturally look for in their alphabetical place. Indexes, even if good—and a good index to an encyclopaedia has never been made—are an unsatisfactory substitute for editorial foresight and co-ordination. Many subjects which might be looked for in their alphabetical locus under A, are reserved for other places; a table (p. xv) indicates the probable titles of the articles where the desired information may be found. Allowance must be made for editorial exigencies; otherwise it might be said that Aesculapius, who is not primarily or exclusively a god of healing, should have had a place to himself rather than be lugged into the article on 'Health'; and that the postponement of Adonis to the article 'Tammuz' implies a begging of the question—is Attis also to be made a 'Tammuz'?

The treatment of the subjects is in general very satisfactory. Ample and well-digested learning was to be expected of the scholars who have co-operated in the work. No less conspicuous, however, is the prevailing sanity of the work, the recognition of the limits of present knowledge, the abstinence from sweeping generalizations from insufficient evidence and unfathomable speculations with no foundation at all. One of the most encouraging things about this Encyclopaedia is the proof it gives that the study of religions, which has suffered so much in the esteem of serious scholars from the vagaries of theorists and faddists, has

been taken up in earnest by men of methodical training and sober judgment, armed with a wholesome scepticism against the universal hypotheses which fit so nicely the facts that are selected—not to say manipulated—to fit them.

The value of the work is enhanced by the conspectus of the literature appended to the several articles; the lists are sufficiently full, and the titles seem to be judiciously selected.

After all criticism, it must be repeated that the volume maintains throughout a remarkably high standard of excellence, and that the Encyclopaedia has at the outset made itself an indispensable place in the apparatus of the student of any part of its wide field.

The "Religious Encyclopedia," better known as "Schaff-Herzog," which was completed in 1884, notwithstanding grave defects, did useful service in many ministers' libraries as a compendious work of reference covering a wide field. It was based mainly upon the second edition (1877-1888) of the *Realencyclopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, but for subjects which fell in the latter part of the German alphabet on the first edition (1853-1868). The severe abridgment of the articles, in some cases, it must be admitted, incompetently done, gave offence to many of the German authors, who saw their contributions mutilated by prentice hands, while their names were affixed to the articles in spite of their disclaimers, and made "Schaff-Herzog" for a while a painful subject to American scholars, who, however unjustly, were held collectively responsible for what was called "a characteristic piece of American enterprise." It is gratifying, therefore, to learn from the preface to the new work that the editors have taken all reasonable pains to avoid this ground of complaint. The translation and condensation have doubtless been much more intelligently done—in some cases the articles have been rewritten by the authors themselves—and the whole has had the benefit of revision in proof by American scholars of good standing in their several fields, who have in many instances supplemented the original treatment of the subject, bringing it down to a more recent date or adapting it to English readers.

On a considerable number of subjects articles by American

scholars have been substituted for the corresponding German articles with manifest advantage. The articles on Old Testament topics in the third edition of the *Realencyclopädie* are, speaking generally, distinctly inferior to those in other departments, such as Church history; some of them, as has repeatedly been pointed out by critics, are a generation or more out of date. The editors have been well advised in replacing them by entirely new articles, many of which are written by Professor McCurdy. The same author has furnished substitutes also for some of the best articles in the German work, such as Baudissin's learned contributions on Astarte and Ashera, Baal and Bel, which either did not admit of condensation or seemed to be more suitable to professional scholars than to the prospective users of the Encyclopedia.² Inasmuch as the biblical articles are not intended to make a Bible Dictionary superfluous, it may be thought that some of them are disproportionately long—for example, Balaam's importance in the history of religion seems to be considerably overestimated.

This criticism applies with greater force to the articles 'Assyria' and 'Babylonia,' by G. W. Gilmore (one of the editors), which together fill more than thirty pages—say roughly about one-seventeenth of the entire volume! They include a detailed account of the excavations and the decipherment of the cuneiform characters—shelf-worn learning which Assyriologists will never spare us; a detailed history of the two countries, which is for the greater part as irrelevant as the history of China; and a sketch of the religion, from which the influence of Babylonian mythology and cosmology or astrological fatalism on the religions of Western Asia seems to be deliberately excluded, though the question is clearly of more concern to the intelligent reader than the pedigree of "Lugal-zaggisi." The article on 'Amarna Tablets' is two and a half times as long as that on the prophet Amos, which, it may be added, is inadequate in other respects than its brevity.

Some large or controversial questions are divided, and discussed by several writers: thus 'Baptism' embraces contributions by Feine, Kattenbusch, Drews, Warfield, Schaff, and Norman

² It is surprising that Baudissin's name should not appear in the Literature of these articles.

Fox; while Professor A. H. Newman writes on 'Baptists.' The composite result is excellent, but of inordinate dimensions, filling, with 'Anabaptists,' about forty-five pages, or close to one eleventh of the volume.

Under 'Africa' H. C. Dwight, one of the editors of the Encyclopedia of Missions, gives full and recent information about the country and its inhabitants, and especially about the work of missions, both Catholic and Protestant; he and his co-editor, E. M. Bliss, supplement Gelzer's article on Armenia by a brief history of the evangelical movement among the Armenians and an account of Armenian immigration to the United States. The co-operation of these two writers promises to give peculiar value to the articles on missionary topics.

Several important articles from the pen of Professor B. B. Warfield, of Princeton Seminary, including 'Annihilationism,' 'Apologetics,' 'Atonement,' are conspicuous for learning, acumen, and admirable clearness of presentation. Other theological articles are written by Professor Beckwith, of Chicago, who has had the general oversight of that department and laid an improving hand on many pages.

One of the features in which "Schaff-Herzog" differs from the German work is the inclusion of short biographical notices of living men whose names may be supposed for some reason to be of interest to the users of the Encyclopedia. The material has whatever authenticity may be given it by the fact that it has been for the most part furnished by the subjects themselves.

Much pains have evidently been spent upon the bibliographies appended to the several articles, and in the preface Mr. Gilmore devotes a dozen pages or more to the general bibliographical apparatus for theology and religion.

The New Schaff-Herzog in every respect excels its predecessor and will doubtless enjoy even greater popularity.

THE HARVARD EXPEDITION TO SAMARIA

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The ruins of the ancient capital of Israel lie on a large, detached hill about six miles northwest of Nablus and twenty miles from the Mediterranean. The hill rises about three hundred and fifty feet above the surrounding valleys, and about fourteen hundred and fifty feet above the sea. It is enclosed by mountains, some of which reach a much greater height. At its base the hill has the appearance of being between four and five miles in circuit. The ascent is everywhere steep, but, owing to a saddle connecting with the mountains on the east, is less steep on that side than on the others. Like all the mountains about it, the hill is covered with large artificial terraces, constructed to prevent the washing away of the soil and to make cultivation easier. The surface of these terraces has a gentle slope, but their sides are in many places so steep as to be climbed only with great difficulty. The entire hill is under cultivation, and there are extensive olive orchards, interspersed with fig and pomegranate trees.

On the eastern slope is a village of about eight hundred inhabitants (Fig. 1).¹ The name of this village, Sebastiyeh (pronounced by the natives Sebustye), perpetuates the name Sebaste, which, in honor of Augustus, Herod gave to the city when he rebuilt it. On the western slope are the ruins of two towers, flanking the gateway through an ancient wall. The principal path on the hill runs south of the summit from this gateway to the village, half a mile distant. It passes by the side of a long row of columns, some standing, some prostrate, which were part of a great colonnade erected by Herod. There is also a group of columns on the

¹ Figures 1, 2, 3, and 7 are drawn by Mr. Clarence S. Fisher. The material for figures 1 and 3 comes almost entirely from larger plans drawn by Dr. Gottlieb Schumacher.

western side of the threshing floor just above the village, commonly supposed to be the remains of a Herodian temple. These form an eastern and a western row; several fallen columns lie scattered about the threshing floor. The area of the threshing floor may be about two acres. Here the heaping up of the harvest begins in May, and the slow process of threshing continues throughout the summer—a circumstance which will make the exploration at this spot especially difficult. To the north of this, about halfway down to the valley, are other rows of columns defining two sides of a structure of great extent, perhaps a hippodrome, or circus. Fragments of columns and carved stones from ancient buildings are built into the houses or lie about the streets of the village; others are found in the walls which divide the fields or are scattered here and there over the ground.

Though long recognized as an important site for exploration, Samaria has deterred explorers by its extent, and by the great cost of the undertaking. The new Turkish law relating to antiquities is very strict, being much like those of Greece and Italy. No one may dig without a permit from the Sultan, and every object found is the property of the government. The discoverer may have photographs, casts, and squeezes, and he may publish the results of his work. The enlargement of knowledge is therefore the only incentive to exploration.

The expenses of the Harvard expedition to Samaria are borne by Mr. Jacob H. Schiff, of New York. In 1905 application was made at Constantinople for a permit, which was granted about two years later. Professor George A. Reisner, who had been originally chosen to conduct the expedition, being at the time engaged in the archæological survey of Upper Egypt, the work at Samaria was intrusted to Doctor Gottlieb Schumacher, of Haifa, who has long resided in the land, and has had much experience in Palestinian excavations. Professor Reisner was able, however, to take a brief leave of absence in April, 1908, when he and Dr. Schumacher went to Samaria and laid out the work to be undertaken the first year. It is expected that next year Professor Reisner will be in charge as originally planned. The present writer joined the expedition in May. With him went Mr. Clarence S. Fisher, of Philadelphia, in the capacity of architect and drafts-

man. Mr. Oric Bates, of Boston, was also on the ground during a part of April.

The actual digging went on only nine weeks (April 24 to May 1, May 22 to June 3, and July 11 to August 21). The interruptions were caused by local difficulties, which happily did not occur again during July and August. The digging was done by men, while women, boys, and girls removed the earth and débris in baskets. The number of laborers varied from ten at the end of the second period to about four hundred during a considerable part of the third. Throughout the second period, the demands of the harvest, and the uncertainty overhanging the work owing to local difficulties, kept the number small and inefficient. The laborers came from Sebastiyeh and the neighboring villages.

The digging was carried on at two points. The first of these was among the standing columns beside the threshing floor (Fig. 2). On the steep downward slope to the north of the columns a trench running east and west (A)² was begun, in order to determine whether dump heaps might be made here without covering up important remains. Rude stone walls were struck near the surface. Below these, at one point, at a depth of about fifteen feet, a wall of dressed blocks of stone was found. Another trench, or rather a pit (B), was dug beside a column which seemed to belong to the southern side of the temple, the floor level being reached at a depth of about ten feet. The column stood on a socle, and was twisted partly out of position as if by earthquake. To the east of it at the level of the socle lay a second column, the end of which projected into the pit. A third pit (C), still further east, was not carried below some late rough walls which were found just below the surface. North of the eastern row of standing columns, and in a line with it, a trench (D) was dug. A few inches below the surface four socles in a line were uncovered. This trench was further lengthened during the third period of digging, and several additional socles were found (Fig. 4). During the same period a fifth pit (M) was dug at the intersection of the western and the southern lines of columns, with a view to determining the southwest angle of the building. No socle was found; but at a depth of about fifteen feet the remains of the foundation

² This trench was a little further north than the space covered by Fig. 2.

were laid bare—a broad wall running from the corner toward the east and toward the north.

The main work of excavation in this building was undertaken along the northern end, cutting back toward the south, on a level with the floor, the space limited by the eastern and western rows of columns. On the eastern end of this cut, about three feet below the surface, we found the top of a foundation wall running east and west. It rests on the rock, and is now fourteen feet high and six feet broad. On the western end of the cut, in a line with the wall just described, was the northern side of a wall of fine masonry of large, well-fitted blocks of stone. This wall turned south in a line with the western row of standing columns, and appears, therefore, to be the northwestern corner of the building. As we cut backward toward the south it became evident that much of the excellent masonry (Fig. 5) at this point was made of stones not in their original position. They had been used again by later architects. A broad curve in the masonry on its inner side suggested the apse of a church, and various details made it probable that the later structure had belonged to the Byzantine period. The original building seems clearly a temple of Roman times. Beneath it we may expect Hebrew remains. If the columns lying about the threshing floor belonged to it, the building was one of vast proportions, and a thorough exploration of it will require the work of a large force for many months.

Of small objects, there were found in these trenches, near the surface, more than two hundred clay lamps from the Arabic period; and, deeper, great masses of broken Roman roof tiles and many fragments of glass vessels and of Greek and Roman pottery.

The second point of excavation was the summit and on the two terraces west of it (Figs. 1 and 3). The lower terrace is an olive grove, and is separated from the upper by a steep and high embankment. A trench (E) was here cut in a direction east and west, and at its eastern end carried to the rock. The foundations of house walls were struck only a few inches below the surface. At the upper edge of the embankment is a massive but rude wall (Fig. 6), probably of Arabic origin, running at this point north and south following the line of the terrace. The embankment was cut

back to a point directly underneath this wall, and then tunnelled on a line with the rock. A few feet back was found the outer face of a massive wall (Fig. 7), resting on the rock, and running north and south. The large size of the stones, the mode of dressing, and the fact that the wall is buried beneath about thirty feet of *débris* seem to make it certain that this is a Hebrew wall—a conclusion confirmed by finding nearby several similar stones with marks such as have been found elsewhere and recognized as made by Hebrew masons. The way in which these loose stones lie suggests that they once formed part of the wall. Of this wall, five courses of stone are still in position. The upper surface of the wall was also reached by the trench (F) on the upper terrace, at a depth of about twenty-one feet, and cleared toward the east for about fourteen feet. This great thickness indicates that the wall must have been one of importance, perhaps the wall of the city or of a citadel. The discovery of the wall came too late in our work to allow further exploration, which must here be slow on account of the great overlying mass of *débris*.

The trench (F) on the upper terrace continued that on the lower, though not in a straight line. It was carried to the rock at two points. At the western end it came upon the upper surface of the Hebrew wall, as already described. Just to the east of this is another wall of smaller stones, resting on the rock and reaching up almost to the present level. Near its base are other loose building blocks, about as large as those in the trench on the lower terrace. Some of the fragments of pottery seem to be of Hebrew origin. Near the middle of the trench were found two cisterns cut in the rock. One of these was cleared of the rubbish which filled it, and it yielded a large quantity of potsherds and bones. The other had, above the rock, a fine rectangular shaft about eight feet deep, formed of squared stones. Leading to the top of this shaft, about five feet below the present level of the ground, was a plastered drain of stone, by which the cistern was fed. Nearby was a variety of rude walls and small chambers, belonging to ancient buildings. At its eastern end this trench ended at the embankment which separates the terrace from the summit.

It was on the summit that most of our work was done. The present form of the summit is due to dumping and levelling, as is

evident from the stratification of the débris (Fig. 8). In the east and west trench (G; Fig. 3) continuing that of the upper terrace was found on June 2, the day before the second period of work closed, a section of a stairway ascending from the north. Fourteen steps were partially uncovered, the uppermost five feet below the surface, the lowest about thirteen feet. One of the steps was dug out to a length of sixteen feet. The blocks of stone composing the stairway are about a yard long, and each tread overlaps by several inches the next lower tread. The height of the risers was about seven inches, and the breadth varied from $14\frac{1}{2}$ to $15\frac{1}{2}$ inches, except in the case of the seventh from above, which is a landing about three feet broad. The stones were well cut and well laid, and the whole staircase, as far as uncovered in June, remarkably well preserved. In the débris were found large quantities of stucco in several colors, but in a condition too fragmentary to make possible the restoration of any of the figures of the decoration.

When the work began again in July, our first task was exploration of the stairway, and we expected to find at its top the base of a column from which three drums about four feet in diameter, on the embankment between the summit and the western terrace, might have come. At the same time two other trenches were started, one running north from where we first struck the stairway (I), the other (H) running south from a point a few feet further to the east. The summit was thus cut into four sections, one of which, the northwestern, we cleared away down to the level of the terrace.

The trench east and west was broadened toward the north and the south, thus laying bare the stairway through its whole width (Fig. 9), which, as indicated by the lines of masonry supporting the eastern and the western ends, was originally eighty feet. Every step has, however, suffered more or less loss at both ends. In the present condition the shortest step is about fifty-seven feet long, and the longest about seventy-three. The steps are sixteen in number. At the top may have been one or two more in order to reach the platform soon to be described. At the foot is a seventeenth step, of softer stone, and consequently much more worn away. Near the eastern end are two other short steps at the foot, likewise much worn. The dimensions and condition of these

three are so different from those of the sixteen as to suggest a different period of construction. At its foot the stairway is supported by a wall of rude masonry, which may be of earlier date. We cleared this wall in part to the level of the rock, about eight feet below. There is another wall, still rougher, running the length of the stairway at its top.

About twelve feet south of the stairway, and from one to two feet below the surface, we found a floor, or platform (Figs. 9, 16), paved with thick slabs of stone. These are of varying size, in general smaller than those composing the stairway. This platform may have been as long as the steps; but has suffered by the removal of stones from its edges. In the present state it is nearly rectangular, its length east and west being fifty-seven feet and its greatest width about twenty-seven. Between the stairway and the platform were found two other large drums of a column.

In the trench running to the south (H), about three feet below the surface, we found a large piece of mosaic floor; a deep cistern at the southern end; and many massive walls of crude workmanship. Near the northern end a cross-wall (Fig. 14, left edge) of later date was preserved almost to the present level of the ground. North of this wall the rest of the trench was cleared down to the rock. There were great masses of *débris*, including numerous large building stones, many of them carved with designs of rosettes, leaves, and the egg-and-dart pattern.³ In the rock were two cisterns or caves and several small bowl-like depressions; likewise shallow trenches or canals. One of these trenches, circular in shape, was part of an ancient oil or wine press. Half of it is concealed by the eastern stair wall, which is, therefore, of later date than the press.

This massive wall of large blocks of stone (Fig. 14) extends from the northeast corner of the stairway to the southern side of the platform. The northern part of this wall, east of the stairway, and the southern part, east of the platform, are in line; but the two sections are not bonded together, and the courses of stone composing them do not match (see also Fig. 17). Moreover, the southern part has a foundation consisting of three courses of smaller stones. These differences suggest that the two parts

³ Some of these stones are now lying on the platform (Fig. 16).

are not of the same age. South of the platform the line of the wall is set back toward the west about one foot (Fig. 3), and then continues southward for an unknown distance. We followed it a hundred and thirty-five feet, to the edge of the plateau of the summit. Only the three lower courses of the foundation are preserved. The stones are set edgewise, the successive courses receding slightly from the perpendicular (Fig. 15). In all probability the higher courses have been removed for use in later buildings. Of such later use the evidence is abundant, fragments of columns, capitals, and other carved stones appearing in the walls now uncovered on the summit.

The long foundation probably belonged to the eastern wall of a temple. There was not time to trace the western wall, nor could we explore the large area between the two; all we had time for was a narrow trench (Fig. 3) running south from the middle of the southern side of the platform. In this trench several walls were met, some at right angles with the trench, others nearly parallel to it.

The wall bounding the stairway and the platform on the west is better preserved than that on the east, and both are several feet lower than the level of the platform. Between the stairway and the platform a trench was dug east and west. Here were found three bases of columns resting on a wall about eight feet thick (Fig. 17). The bases were in a line, and their diameters were about six feet. From their position on the eastern half of the wall one would judge that there may have been six or eight of the columns. The bases are all overturned, and the great wall on which they rest seems to be a foundation rather than a finished wall. They may have been overturned in order to extract for building material the better quality of finished stone on which they once rested. South of the platform is a similar cross-wall, not quite so thick. On the top of this was found a copper coin of Herod, of a well-known type.

All these enclosing walls are at present several feet lower than the platform (Fig. 9), and are probably of earlier date than the platform and the stairway. That other buildings still earlier occupied the site appears from the fact that a trench in the western part of the enclosure revealed other cross-walls beneath the mass of débris

on which the platform rests. It seems likely that this was a sacred spot from Hebrew times down.

On the west of the stairway we dug out a great chamber (Fig. 13) lying east and west, about forty by twenty feet. It is cut partly out of the rock, and its top, which seems to have been flat, is on a line with the bottom step of the stairway. Its northern wall is likewise in line with the northern wall supporting the stairway. In the northern wall of the chamber are two windows and a doorway, with several steps leading downward on the interior (Fig. 12). The walls are very massive, and the roof was an arch, of which the course next to the western wall of the stairway is still in place. All the rest of the roof was broken in. Among the architectural fragments in the débris was a large drum, coming perhaps from one of the columns which stood on the wall north of the platform. The walls of the chamber had been covered with a heavy coat of plaster, on which there seemed to be traces of color. In the eastern end of the floor is a large cavern or cistern, which we explored to a depth of about six feet. It was filled with large stones and earth, and was already filled when the chamber was in use, as is clear from the fact that the floor passes over the top of the cistern. Through this floor a trench was dug near the middle of the chamber, and the levels of earlier floors of stamped earth were thus brought to light. In the western wall is a doorway, the sill of which is on a level with the latest floor of the chamber. It may have led into other chambers. The western wall continues an unknown distance to the north of the chamber. Between it and the great stairway are several other massive walls, proceeding northward from the wall of the chamber (Fig. 13).

A few Greek graffiti were found, and about one hundred and fifty of the so-called Rhodian, stamped amphora-handles; also many fragments of Latin inscriptions on bits of marble slabs. The only complete inscription is on the side of a stele (Fig. 18) which was found on the stairway near the bottom. The stele is nearly four feet in height, and has a shallow, bowl-like depression on the top. Professor Clifford H. Moore, of Harvard University, has kindly resolved the abbreviations and translated the inscription:

J(ovi) O(ptimo) M(aximo)	To Jupiter Optimus Maximus,
mil(ites) VI XII	Soldiers of the Sixth and Twelfth
coh(ortium) P(annoniorum) su-	Cohorts of Upper Pannonians,
p(eriorum)	two (?) citizens of Siscia,
cives Sisci(ani)	(and) Varciani
II (?) Varcian(i)	and Latobici,
et Latobici	have made this dedication.
sacrum fecer(unt)	

In the trench running north from the stairway, and only a few feet from it, was found, beneath about fifteen feet of débris, the torso of a statue of heroic size (Figs. 19, 20), finely carved out of a block of white marble. It was lying on its back. Head, arms, legs, and feet are gone, but the trunk is united to the base by a massive square column. The head, left arm, and one of the legs were attached by dowels, as appears from the sockets in the torso. The base is nearly three feet square and a little over five inches thick. Including the base, the figure is now, without its head, over eight feet in height. A robe is thrown over the left shoulder, and a breastplate covers the body. The dress, pose, and fine workmanship seem to make it certain that this statue is that of a Roman emperor, probably that of Augustus, though by a change of the head it may have served also for later emperors. Nearby was found a piece of a large hand which may have belonged to the statue. About two hundred feet to the south, at a depth of some eight feet, a fragment of a large head (Fig. 21) was excavated, of which the eyes, forehead, and part of the nose remain. Both material and work seem inferior to the statue; and the head probably belonged to a second piece of sculpture of heroic size. Our statue may have stood on a pedestal near where it lay, but no trace of a pedestal was discovered. The statue lay on a thin bed of earth of a gray color. This bed could be traced along the walls of the trench, and marks the beaten level at the time when the statue fell.

When the northwest section of the summit was dug away to the level of the terrace below, there appeared a few feet to the west of the statue and about the same distance to the north of the stairway, a Roman altar (Figs. 3, 9, 11), about thirteen feet long from east to west, and a little more than half as wide. Beneath the beaten

level just described (Fig. 11) is the foundation of rough stones on which the altar rests. Above this level the altar rises in six courses of stone, with mouldings near the top and bottom, to a height of about six feet. Part of the upper surface is gone. The walls of the altar were covered with stucco, some of which was still in position. East of the altar, and almost touching it, was a second stele, with a much-defaced Latin inscription. It is between three and four feet high, and rested in a socket which was buried in the earth to about the level of the beaten floor.⁴ North and south of this were two similar sockets, in which other stelae doubtless once stood. No steps to the altar were found. From the north a broad inclined plane (Fig. 10) of gentle slope led up to its top. There may have been a revetment or a covering of stucco to cover the very rough masonry of this approach to the altar.

West of the altar a small space was cleared to the rock, and here were found two large blocks of stone, on one of which was a mark like those made by Hebrew masons. The stones probably come from a Hebrew building which may have stood near this spot.

In the trench containing the statue, and a few feet north of it, occurs a perpendicular cut in the rock, running east and west. The bottom of this cut is about seven feet deep, and to this depth a space of about sixteen feet square was cleared. The remarkable feature in this clearing is a rock column, nearly round, and about a yard in diameter. It stands in its original position, being cut out of the rock, to which it is still joined at the bottom. Further excavation may make its meaning clear. In the pit which revealed this column were found many fragments of colored stucco, several of them containing remnants of a Greek inscription, the letters of which are scratched through the paint. There are similar scratchings representing a bird and part of the figure of an animal.


The foregoing is an account of our first year's work at Samaria.

⁴ Professor Clifford H. Moore thinks that this stele also may have been set up by soldiers from Pannonia, described in the inscription as *cives Bot(ivenses)*, or *cives Bol(entiani)*. If the reading BOT is correct, the soldiers came from Botivo in Upper Pannonia. If BOL is the right reading, they came from Bolentium, also in Upper Pannonia.


While most of the structures whose remains have been discovered seem to be later than the Roman annexation of Palestine, the work has not gone far enough to make it possible to distinguish clearly the different periods represented, and all suggestions as to dates must be provisional. It seems very probable that the massive wall surrounding the platform is Herodian, and the altar may belong to the same era. The platform and the great stairway seem to be younger; while the walls south of the platform are perhaps older.

The stele found on the stairway was dedicated by soldiers stationed in Palestine, probably after the great Jewish war under Hadrian (132-134 A.D.). The time and circumstance of the ruin of the edifices upon the summit are unknown. The stone of which they were built, taken in part from older structures, was used over and over by later builders.

Some of our most promising discoveries came so late in the season's work that we could not follow up the clues which they offered. Having for good reasons chosen August 21 as the date for closing the work of digging, we could not go on longer, however many questions were left unanswered. The campaign of 1909 should answer some of these; and we hope it may be rich in the finds of Hebrew origin.



1. PLAN OF SEBASTIYEH, SHOWING ANCIENT WALL, VILLAGE, AND
POINTS OF EXCAVATION



2. PLAN OF THE EXCAVATIONS NEAR THE VILLAGE

SEBASTIYEH

EXCAVATIONS


ON

SUMMIT

IN

1908

- First Post-Jewish per.
- Second do.
- Third(?) do.
- Fourth do.
- Restorations
- original trenches



3. PLAN OF EXCAVATIONS ON SUMMIT AND TERRACES



4. NORTHEAST CORNER OF EXCAVATIONS NEAR THE VILLAGE,
LOOKING SOUTH




5. NORTHWEST CORNER OF EXCAVATIONS NEAR THE VILLAGE,
LOOKING SOUTH

6. EASTERN END OF TRENCH E, LOOKING EAST



7. WESTERN FACE OF HERREW WALL, TRENCH E





8. SECTION OF SUMMIT, SHOWING STRATIFICATION OF DÉBRIS,
LOOKING NORTH



9. GENERAL VIEW OF SUMMIT EXCAVATIONS, LOOKING SOUTHWEST



10. ALTAR WITH STONE APPROACH THERETO, LOOKING EAST



11. ALTAR AFTER REMOVAL OF APPROACH, LOOKING SOUTHWEST



12. VAULTED CHAMBER, NORTHWEST CORNER, LOOKING EAST
OF NORTH



13. VAULTED CHAMBER AND STAIRWAY, LOOKING SOUTHEAST



14. WALL ON EAST SIDE OF STAIRWAY AND PLATFORM, LOOKING
SOUTHWEST




15. FOUNDATION OF WALL RUNNING SOUTH, CONTINUING WALL
OF FIG. 14, LOOKING SOUTHWEST



16. PLATFORM AT HEAD OF STAIRWAY, LOOKING WEST



17. TRENCH BETWEEN STAIRWAY AND PLATFORM, LOOKING WEST




18. INSCRIBED STELE FOUND ON STAIRWAY,
NEAR BOTTOM STEP



19. TRENCH I, SHOWING STATUE, LOOKING
NORTH



20. NEARER VIEW OF STATUE, LOOKING SOUTH



21. FRAGMENT OF LARGE HEAD FROM SOUTHERN EDGE OF SUMMIT

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- RACE QUESTIONS, PROVINCIALISM, AND OTHER AMERICAN PROBLEMS. *By Josiah Royce.* 12mo, pp. 13+287. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1908. \$1.25 net.
- THE EDUCATIONAL IDEAL IN THE MINISTRY. *By William Herbert Perry Faunce.* 12mo, pp. 7+286. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1908. \$1.25 net.
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- THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS. *By Edgar J. Goodspeed.* 12mo, pp. 9+132. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1908. \$1.50 net.
- THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MORAL IDEAS. *By Edward Westermarck.* Vol. II. 8vo, pp. 15+852. London: The Macmillan Company. 1908. \$3.50 net.
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- DE PROFUNDIS CLAMAVI AND OTHER POEMS. *By John Hunter.* 12mo, pp. 326. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1908. \$1.50 net.
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- MODERNISM. *By Paul Sabatier. Translated by C. A. Miles.* 12mo, pp. 350. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1908. \$1.25 net.
- JESUS AND MODERN RELIGION. *By Edwin A. Rumball.* 12mo, pp. 11+155. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1908. .75 net.
- GOD. AN ENQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF MAN'S HIGHEST IDEAL, AND A SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM FROM THE STAND-POINT OF SCIENCE. *By Paul Carus.* 12mo, pp. 4+249. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1908. \$1.00 net.
- WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT JESUS. *By Charles F. Dole.* 12mo, pp. 13+89. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1908. .75 net.
- LIFE AND MINISTRY OF JESUS, ACCORDING TO THE HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL METHOD. *By Rudolph Otto. Translated by H. J. Whitby.* 12mo, pp. 85. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1908. .50 net.
- PARALIPOMENA. REMAINS OF GOSPELS AND SAYINGS OF CHRIST. *By Bernard Pick.* 12mo, pp. 11+158. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1908. .75 net.
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- THE TRUE CHURCH. A STUDY, HISTORICAL AND SCRIPTURAL. *By Allen Macy Dulles.* 12mo, pp. 319. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1908. \$1.25 net.
- A SHORT GRAMMAR OF THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT. *By A. T. Robertson.* 12mo, pp. 30+240. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1908. \$1.50 net.
- A GUIDE TO THE STUDY OF CHURCH HISTORY. *By W. J. McGlothlin.* 12mo, pp. 264. Louisville, Ky.: Baptist World Publishing Company. 1908. \$1.50 net.
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- THE STORY OF THE REVISED NEW TESTAMENT, AMERICAN STANDARD EDITION.** *By Matthew Brown Riddle.* 12mo, pp. 89. Philadelphia: The Sunday School Times Publishing Company. 1908. .75 net.
- THE DEITY OF JESUS CHRIST, ACCORDING TO THE GOSPEL OF JOHN.** *By S. W. Pratt.* 12mo, pp. 165. Philadelphia: The Sunday School Times Publishing Company.
- THE COLLECTION OF JEWISH CEREMONIAL OBJECTS IN THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL MUSEUM.** From Proceedings of the United States National Museum. Vol. XXXIV, pp. 701-746. *By Cyrus Adler and I. M. Casanowicz.* Washington: Government Printing Office. 1908.
- DISCOVERIES IN HEBREW, GAELIC, GOTHIC, ANGLO-SAXON, LATIN, BASQUE, AND OTHER CAUCASIC LANGUAGES.** *By Allison Emery Drake.* 8vo, pp. 6+402. Denver: The Herrick Book and Stationery Company. \$6.00 net.
- FLOWERS OF SONG FROM MANY LANDS.** *Rendered into English by Frederick Rowland Marvin.* 8vo, pp. 138. Troy, N.Y.: the Pafraets Book Company. 1908.
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- ACTS . . . WITH INTERPRETATIVE COMMENT.** *By George Holley Gilbert.* 12mo, pp. 267. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1908. .75 net.
- GREAT MEN OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.** *By Williston Walker.* 8vo, pp. 9+378. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1908. \$1.50 net.

